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PAPER PROMISES FOR DRUG INNOVATION
Erika Lietzan
INTRODUCTION
Innovation does not stop when new medicines are launched. Companies
with approved drugs and biologics continue to study their products for years
after the initial approval-for instance, exploring new ways to formulate
their drugs or modifying the active ingredients to introduce versions with
different, and sometimes better, safety and effectiveness profiles. They also
routinely study their products for usefulness in treating new conditions. This
continued research requires time and money, and companies will not invest
that time and money without adequate reason to do so. This Article examines
the incentives federal law provides for new-use research, concluding that cur-
rent incentives are little more than paper promises.
U.S. law provides two primary incentives for companies to study new
uses of approved medicines: patent protection and regulatory exclusivity. I As
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I am grateful for comments
from Bruce Artim, Richard Epstein, Betsy Flanagan, Dmitri Karshtedt, David Kom, Neal Parker, Nichol-
son Price, and Jon Santamauro. I am also grateful for comments from audience members and fellow pan-
elists at two conferences where this Article was presented-Real Intellectual Property Reform, Center for
the Protection of Intellectual Property, Scalia Law School (Oct. 12-13, 2017), and Clinical Innovation:
Fair and Effective Incentives for New Uses of Established Drugs, University College London and
Georgetown University Law Center (Feb 8-9, 2018)--including Robert Armitage, Becky Eisenberg, and
Kurt Karst. Finally, I am grateful for the research assistance of James Kopfensteiner (University of Mis-
souri School of Law, Class of 2018) and for research grants from Shook, Hardy & Bacon and the Hulston
Faculty Research Fellowship in Healthcare Law.
1 Various other aspects of state and federal law might, in some capacity ancillary to their primary
function, encourage companies to study new uses (for instance, as a condition of insurance coverage). See
infra note 52. This Article focuses on new-use patents and regulatory exclusivity, however, which are
designed to encourage new-use research. It uses the phrase "regulatory exclusivity" to refer to exclusivi-
ties administered by FDA. The phrase is not meant to imply that the exclusivities are regulatory inven-
tions. They are not; they appear in federal statute. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Regulatory exclusivities include five-year exclusivity for new
chemical entities, three-year exclusivity for new drug products and new (drug) conditions of use, and
twelve-year exclusivity for biological products. Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES
(CDER Small Bus. and Industry Assistance Division, Silver Spring, MD), May 19, 2015, at 2; Erika
Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 91,93 (2016) (noting the twelve-year
period for biological products). These are also known as "data exclusivity" or "data protection," because
they prevent a company's competitor from relying in its own application on the data that supported the
approval in question. See Lietzan, supra, at 107 (describing data exclusivity as a period before the time
when competitors can gain a license from another's previous research). Regulatory exclusivity also
PAPER PROMISES FOR DRUG INNOVATION
a general rule, patents and regulatory exclusivity are designed to operate as
temporary barriers to entry, allowing the beneficiary to enjoy an exclusive
position in the marketplace. 2 The attendant profits operate as the incentive to
conduct the research in question, and society accepts the short-term pricing
consequences of exclusivity because it deems the research beneficial.'
At the same time, U.S. law is designed in part to ensure prompt approval
of lower cost generic drugs when patents and exclusivity protecting the active
ingredient and initial use of a medicine expire and to facilitate automatic sub-
stitution of those generic drugs when physicians prescribe the corresponding
brand products.4 In connection with the approval, distribution, and use of ge-
neric drugs, however, Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") practices and
policies, state laws and policies, and healthcare professional and payer be-
haviors undercut the patents and exclusivity protecting new uses.5 In fact,
generic drugs are routinely and knowingly dispensed for "infringing uses,"
defined in this Article to mean uses covered by another company's patent or
regulatory exclusivity. 6 Moreover, it is nearly impossible under current law
for innovators to enforce their rights.
This must stop. It turns the incentives to develop new uses into nothing
more than paper promises. As this Article explains, the practices and policies
that give rise to this problematic dispensing are not necessary to ensure
prompt approval and rapid uptake of generic drugs for non-infringing uses.
And there is no excuse for a system that is clumsy and over-inclusive, result-
ing in sales and uses that are indisputably inconsistent with the objectives of
federal law.
Legal, economic, and health policy scholars have grappled for years
with what Professor Eisenberg once dubbed the "new-use problem"-the
challenge of encouraging new-use innovation in the face of a broader
healthcare system (meaning the system that governs approval, prescribing,
dispensing, and paying for medicines) that effectively ignores new-use
includes seven-year orphan exclusivity, which is better understood as a type of "market exclusivity," be-
cause it precludes approval of competing drugs even when supported by original data. See id. at 110-11.
2 See infra Part II. The beneficiary may still face competition in the marketplace, in the form of
competing products to treat the same condition.
3 There is a vast literature, beyond the scope of this Article, exploring the benefits and costs of
patent protection from a utilitarian perspective. E.g., Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The
New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV 1399, 1423 (2013) ("Patent law,
then, must always maintain the uneasy balance between providing sufficient incentives to invent and dis-
close, which in the aggregate, promote further innovation, and guarding against granting overly broad
patents, which retard further research and thus are detrimental to the common good.").
4 See Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medi-
cines, 44 FLA. ST. L. REV. 883, 888-89, 936-37 (2017).
5 See infra Part 1ll.
6 This Article refers to these sales as "infringing sales" and the uses as "infringing uses," although
this is not meant to imply that the innovator has a cause of action against anyone in particular for the sale
or use in question. In some cases, the innovator might-as when a use infringes a patent claiming the
method of use. See infra Section III.B.
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patents and exclusivity. 7 This Article adds to the conversation, suggesting
that there is nothing wrong with the patent and regulatory exclusivity incen-
tives in themselves, aside from their being so easily circumvented, and that
policymakers should focus on reforming the policies and practices in the
healthcare system that lead to their circumvention.
Thus, FDA should revise its practices and policies that lead to automatic
substitution of generic drugs for infringing uses, and the agency should en-
force its existing rules and policies that would prevent generic companies
from inducing this substitution. And policymakers should consider legisla-
tion to stimulate the key stakeholders (pharmacists, payers, and generic com-
panies) to develop a system that will prevent infringing sales and uses. Left
to their own devices but properly motivated, these stakeholders might turn to
indication-based prescribing, dispensing, and pricing.
This Article claims that the new-use problem is not an inherent inade-
quacy of new-use patents or new-use exclusivity but, instead, a combination,
of policies and practices in the broader healthcare system that are not neces-
sary to achieve cost-savings from appropriately dispensed generic drugs. Ra-
ther than enacting new intellectual property incentives or radically changing
how medical research is funded, policymakers should take the more modest
step of motivating stakeholders to develop a system that allows patents and
exclusivity to have the effect Congress intended.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes new-use innovation:
how and why it occurs, and the value it brings. Part II describes the two pri-
mary incentives for new-use innovation provided by federal law: patents and
regulatory exclusivity. Part III describes the rules, policies, and practices at
FDA, in the states, and in the healthcare delivery and finance systems that
effectively eviscerate new-use patents and exclusivity, and it explains why
innovators are essentially unable to enforce their rights. Part IV describes the
steps that FDA should take to correct its own rules, policies, and practices
that contribute to the new-use problem. It also describes several legislative
options for Congress that should motivate the key stakeholders to design a
system that avoids infringing sales and uses, and it briefly responds to some
of the primary objections these proposals would face.
The Conclusion describes some of the alternative solutions proposed for
the new-use problem. This Article does not take a position in favor of any of
the legislative options described in Part IV, which deserve more thorough
7 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHiCS 717,
720 (2005) (concluding that patents, FDA regulations, and trade secrecy "offer[] firms some protection
from free riders" but that "each has significant shortcomings as a regulatory mechanism for promoting
the development of information about the effects of drugs"). This Article does not review the literature in
the field, nor does it catalog the solutions offered by others. For an introduction to the scholarship on these
issues, consider Professor Eisenberg's essay as well as Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New
Uses (Oct. 14,2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting numerous strategies to address
the problem but ultimately focusing on use of information technology to provide pharmaceutical compa-
nies with information about indication-based prescribing and dispensing, so that they can set differential
prices and enforce new-use patents).
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vetting than is possible here. Instead, it claims that the relevant stakeholders
could solve the problem of new uses if properly motivated. The Conclusion
explains that policymakers should try this type of approach first, rather than
a more fundamental change to how we encourage innovation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW USES
Approval of a new drug or biological product-collectively, here,
"medicines" or "products"-requires a marketing application demonstrating
the medicine in question is safe and effective when used as described in the
labeling for prescribers. s Developing the data necessary for approval of this
application entails laboratory and animal ("preclinical") studies followed by
human ("clinical") studies that usually proceed in phases from small trials
examining how the body and drug interact to larger trials that prove safety
and effectiveness. 9 A typical program culminates in two randomized, con-
trolled, double-blinded trials designed to test the product's effectiveness for
each medical use (also known as an "indication") in its labeling. 10 These final
trials-also known as its "phase 3 trials"-are usually the most expensive
part of a premarket research and development program. " At the end of this
process, the manufacturer submits a marketing application describing the
8 Biological medicines and non-biological medicines reach the market pursuant to applications
filed under different statutes. FDA "licenses" biologics under section 351 of the Public Health Service
Act ("PHSA"), Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)).
It "approves" non-biological "drugs" under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (20i2)).
This Article uses "medicines" to refer to both together, but "drug" or "biologic" when the distinction
matters or when referring to a specific product.
9 FDA's regulations describe three phases of clinical trials. Phase 1 trials are small trials, often in
healthy volunteers, designed to generate safety information and information about how the body processes
the drug. Phase 2 trials involve more subjects, often with the disease under investigation, and generates
preliminary measurements of the drug's effects on the body as well as information about optimal dosing.
The process ends with phase 3 trials designed to test whether use of a particular finished product (which
the company plans to commercialize) achieves a particular clinical endpoint in a specific population. See
21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2017). These regulations describe the traditional approach, but in practice the modem
approach is more varied. For example, a company might combine aspects of different phases in one trial
(such as a "phase 1/2 trial") or proceed seamlessly from one phase to the next. Regardless of the precise
design of a clinical program, it proceeds in stages as more is learned about the compound, and it concludes
with trials that demonstrate effectiveness for a particular use.
10 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (defining the "substantial evidence" standard for new drug approval);
21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (defining adequate and well-controlled investigations).
11 In 2016, the average development costs for an approved drug were $25.3 million for phase 1,
$58.6 million for phase 2, and $255.4 million for phase 3. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 24 (2016); cf Institute
of Medicine (IOM), TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 3-4 (2010) ("Phase Ill clinical trials have become extraordinarily expensive.").
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product, how it is made, and the data generated during research and develop-
ment. I2
FDA approval of a new medicine means that the medicine's benefits
outweigh its risks when it is used as described in the labeling, based on the
data from this rigorous-yet inherently limited-premarket program. "3 After
approval, the company's understanding of the medicine's safety and effec-
tiveness for the labeled uses becomes more refined, as the medicine is used
by a broader population over a longer period of time than could be studied
before approval. '4
Companies typically also continue to invest in research and develop-
ment. '5 A company might seek to improve the clinical profile of its product,
for instance, by developing a formulation or route of administration with a
better safety profile (particularly if widespread clinical use has given rise to
concerns that were not evident in the limited and controlled premarket trials)
or improved effectiveness (perhaps by extending the drug's half-life in the
body). 6 Some incremental innovations can lead to therapeutic options for
previously untreated subpopulations; for example, a new dosage form might
be suitable for geriatric patients. 17 Others might improve the convenience of
the product; for example, an extended release formulation may reduce the
frequency of dosing, which can improve patient compliance and in turn
12 21 C.F.R. § 314.50; 21 C.F.R. § 601.2.
13 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (requiring new drug applications to discuss "why the benefits ex-
ceed the risks under the conditions stated in the labeling"); FDA, CRITICAL PATH OPPORTUNITIES REPORT
R-8 (Mar. 2006) (discussing approval once "uncertainty" about benefit-risk balance has been "reduced
to an acceptable level"); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (FDA "generally
considers a drug safe when the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its use").
14 FDA, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA): ADDING RESOURCES AND IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE N FDA REVIEW OF NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS 17 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM149130.pdf ("Knowledge about a product
will always be limited to some extent at the time of approval by factors in the product development pro-
cess.").
15 A company with an approved new drug or biological product spends an average of $312 million
(capitalized to the point of market approval) on post-approval research and development. DiMasi, supra
note 11, at 26-27.
16 E.g., Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-On Drugs and Indications: The Importance of
Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 89, 90 (2008) (noting that the first-
ever inhaled insulin was shown in clinical trials "to have a more rapid onset of action than other forms of
injected insulin").
17 E.g., J6rg Breitkreutz & Joachim Boos, Paediatric and Geriatric Drug Delivery, 4 EXPERT
OPINION ON DRUG DELIVERY 37, 37 (2006) (noting that children and the elderly struggle with swallowing
solid oral dosage forms and fare better with liquid dosage forms, provided they are palatable); Albert I.
Wertheimer & Thomas M. Santella, Pharmacoevolution: The Advantages of Incremental Innovation 9
(2005) (working paper), http://www.who.intlintellectualproperty/submissions/en/Pharmacoevolution.pdf
(noting that new dosage forms for beta blockers allowed patients to customize their dosage regimens and
provided liquids and chewable dosage forms for senior patients).
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health outcomes. I8 New combinations can simplify dosing regimens and in-
crease patient compliance. 19 New combinations can also provide safer op-
tions for patients than monotherapy; the classic example is fixed-dose com-
bination regimens for treatment of HIV. 20
Innovators also routinely study their approved products in additional
diseases and conditions. Some new uses may fall within the same therapeutic
class, as when a cancer medicine is developed to treat additional cancers. For
example, FDA approved Temodar (temozolomide) in 1999 for treatment of
adult patients with refractory anaplastic astrocytoma (one type of brain tu-
mor), and the drug is now also approved to treat newly diagnosed glioblas-
toma multiforme (another type of brain tumor). 21 An example outside the
cancer area would be Activase (alteplase), a blood clot dissolving agent ap-
proved in 1987 for treatment of acute myocardial infarction.22 FDA licensed
this biologic in 1990 for treatment of acute massive pulmonary embolisms 23
and in 1996 for treatment of acute ischemic stroke. 24 In other instances, sub-
sequent research may establish a product's potential in new therapeutic
18 E.g., J.-M.R. Detry et al., Patient Compliance and Therapeutic Coverage: Comparison of Am-
lodipine and Slow Release Nifedipine in the Treatment of Hypertension, 47 EUR. J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 477, 480 (1995) (finding that compliance and therapeutic coverage were superior with
once-daily treatment to twice-daily treatment); L.A. Donnelly et al., Adherence in Patients Transferred
from Immediate Release Metformin to a Sustained Release Formulation: A Population-Based Study, 11
DIABETES, OBESITY & METABOLISM 338, 340-41 (2009) (finding extended release metformin associated
with increased adherence and improved glycemic control); Li Wang et al., Effects and Patient Compliance
of Sustained-Release Versus Immediate-Release Glipizides in Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus: A
Systematic Review andMeta-Analysis, 4 J. EVIDENCE-BASED MED. 232 (2011) (reviewing studies finding
that "sustained-release glipizide appears to achieve similar glucose control with decreased insulin. secre-
tion, fewer hypoglycemic episodes, and higher patient compliance than immediate-release glipizide"). See
also Wertheimer & Santella, supra note 17, at 11 (explaining that the development of controlled-release
formulations for cardiovascular drugs led to once-daily nifedipine and once-weekly transdermal clonidine,
both of which led to improved compliance and in turn decreased overall costs).
19 E.g., Ying-Chang Tung et al., Medication Compliance and Clinical Outcomes of Fixed-Dose
Combinations vs Free Combinations of an Angiotensin 11 Receptor Blocker and a Calcium Channel
Blocker in Hypertension Treatment, 19 J. CLINICAL HYPERTENSION 983, 987 (2017) (finding, in a retro-
spective analysis of 1136 patients in a claims database, that use of a fixed-dose combination "was associ-
ated with better medication adherence and persistence and survival free from [major adverse cardiac
events] and hospitalization for heart failure").
20 Cohen & Kaitin, supra note 16, at 90 ("Another illustration is the HIV/AIDS combination product
lopinavir/ritonavir, which was added to the [World Health Organization's Essential Drug List] because of
an improved safety and tolerability profile compared with the first-in-class drug, ritonavir.").
21 Compare TEMODAR PACKAGE INSERT (1999), 141-48 with TEMODAR PACKAGE INSERT (Re-
vised Oct. 2017), at 1.
22 Press Release, Genetech, Licensing of Activase Marks New Era in Treating Heart Attacks (Nov.
13, 1987), https://www.gene.com/media/press-releases/4271/1987-11-13/licensing-of-activase-marks-
new-era-in-t.
23 2dActivase Approval, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1990, at D4.
24 ACTIVASE PACKAGE INSERT (Revised Jan. 2017), at 1; Carl T. Hall, Activase Gets FDA Approval
/Genentech Can Market Heart Drugfor Strokes, SF GATE (June 19, 1996,4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.
com/business/article/Activase-Gets-FDA-Approva-Genentech-can-market-2978288.php.
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categories. For example, FDA licensed Cimzia (certolizumab pegol) in 2008
for reducing the signs and symptoms of Crohn's disease, an inflammatory
bowel disease that can lead to abdominal pain, severe diarrhea, fatigue,
weight loss, and malnutrition.2 5 This biologic is now also licensed for treat-
ment of rheumatoid arthritis, active psoriatic arthritis, and active ankylosing
spondylitis. 2 6 To give another example, FDA licensed Xgeva (denosumab) in
2010 for treatment of postmenopausal women with osteoporosis at high risk
of fracture, and in 2013 it licensed this biologic for treatment of adults and
skeletally mature adolescents with giant cell tumor of the bone that is unre-
sectable.27
Some research suggests that new-use innovation is especially common
for biological products, which can treat a half dozen or more distinct condi-
tions. 28 Avastin (bevacizumab) illustrates this. FDA approved Avastin in
2004 for the first-line treatment of patients with metastatic carcinoma of the
colon and rectum.29 Today, the product has six indications--one in colorectal
cancer, plus indications relating to non-squamous non-small cell lung cancer,
glioblastoma, metastatic renal cell carcinoma, cervical cancer, and recurrent
epithelial ovarian, fallopian tube, or primary peritoneal cancer. 3o
The inspiration for new-use research varies. Even during its premarket
research program, a medicine's chemical class or mechanism of action may
give rise to suspicions that it will treat more than one disease. The innovator
may nevertheless defer investigation of additional indications while it gener-
ates the data necessary for initial marketing approval. Research and develop-
ment of new medicines are expensive and time-consuming, and revenue from
the initial approval can fund further research and development.3' In some
cases, instead of deferring additional indications until after FDA approval,
an innovator might take its planned indications into phase 3 one at a time. In
other words, it might start the second indication in phase 2 (to settle on
25 CIMZIA PACKAGE INSERT (Apr. 18, 2008), at 1.
26 CIMZIA PACKAGE INSERT (Revised Jan. 2017), at 1. See also David E. Potter, Can We Find New
Uses for Old Drugs? One Word. Viagra, STAT (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/04/26/
ketamine-drugs-repurposing/ ("There are a number of other promising candidates for repurposing: meca-
mylamine, ropinirole, and valsartan were all originally used for high blood pressure but are now being
examined for treating depression, Parkinson's disease, and Alzheimer's disease, respectively. Tamoxifen,
originally used for breast cancer, and amphotericin B, an antifungal drug, might both be useful in bipolar
disorder.").
27 FDA, Xgeva BLA 125320 Approval Letter (June 1, 2010); FDA, Xgeva Supplement
BLA125320/94 Approval Letter (June 13, 2013).
28 E.g., Maya Said et al., CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF APPROVED BIOLOGICAL DRUGS: A
QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS APPROVED POSTLAUNCH IN THE UNITED STATES3
(2007) (noting that 47% of biologics for recombinant DNA products and monoclonal antibodies regulated
by CDER had at least one additional indication).
29 AVASTIN PACKAGE INSERT (2004), 1156-58 (2004).
30 AVASTIN PACKAGE INSERT § 1 (2018).
31 DiMasi 2016, supra note 11, at 31 (estimating a total capitalized preapproval cost of developing
a new drug or new biological product at 2.558 billion U.S. 2013 dollars).
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dosage, among other things) once the first indication has gone into phase 3.
Taking this staged approach can eliminate some of the financial risk to a
company if the first indication fails, because the second indication will follow
closely behind. To give an example, Ampyra (dalfampridine) completed its
phase 2 trials for multiple sclerosis just a few months after the second phase
3 trial for treatment of spinal cord injury failed.3 2 If both indications succeed,
the first indication leads to initial approval of the medicine, and work on the
second indication leads to new-use approval within a few years.
Serendipity sometimes plays a role in inspiring new-use research. The
initial premarket testing may have signaled an unexpected but promising ad-
ditional use, which was deferred until after the initial application was sub-
mitted or even approved. A classic example is Evista (raloxifene). The trials
supporting its approval in 1997 for osteoporosis prevention produced sec-
ondary data suggesting that breast cancer risk reduction was another possible
use.33 This eventually led to approval for two breast cancer indications. 34 In
other cases, healthcare providers treating patients for one condition may have
reported therapeutic benefits for seemingly unrelated conditions. 35 For exam-
ple, the usefulness of thalidomide-which had been marketed as a sedative
and antiemetic, though not in the United States-for treating the cutaneous
symptoms of leprosy was discovered after a physician administered some,
for sedation purposes, to a patient with mania and leprosy.3 6
However they are discovered, later-developed uses can play a signifi-
cant public health role. The classic example is interferon. FDA approved In-
tron A (interferon alfa-2b) in 1986 for treatment of hairy cell leukemia, a
form of blood cancer that afflicts 1000 to 3000 Americans every year.37- In
1991, the agency approved interferon for treatment of hepatitis C, a devas-
tating bloodborne virus that causes severe liver damage over time, is the lead-
ing cause of cirrhosis and liver cancer, and affects more than 3 million people
in the United States.38 The drug company innovated further, combining in-
terferon with ribavirin in 1998, and the cure rate rose to 42% for one genotype
32 Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 Mo. L. REV. 39, 90-91 (2018).
33 Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Impact of Economic, Regulatory, and Patent Policies on
Innovation in Cancer Chemoprevention, I CANCER PREVENTION RES. 84, 85 (2008).
34 FDA, NDA 22-042, NDA 20-815/S-025 Approval Letter (Sept. 13, 2007).
35 H. Subcomm. on Health & Env't, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., Preliminary Re-
port of the Survey on Drugs for Rare Disease 9 (Comm. Print 1982) (noting that sometimes drugs ap-
proved for common ailments are later discovered in the clinic-meaning by practicing physicians-to
have the potential to treat a new disease).
36 Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, Market Ex-
clusivity, and the Future of "New" Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 31-32 (2018).
37 FDA to Approve Interferon for Use Against Rare Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1986, at A20.
38 PHRMA, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS AGAINST HEPATITIS C: SETBACKS AND STEPPING
STONES 5-6, 9 (2014) [hereinafter PHRMA, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS].
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of the virus.39 This was followed by further incremental innovation-pegyla-
tion of the interferon molecule-to provide a longer half-life and then ap-
proval of the pegylated version in combination with ribavirin in 2001, fifteen
years after FDA first approved interferon. 4 At the end of this sequence of
incremental innovations, which started with a new-use discovery, the overall
cure rate for hepatitis C leapt to 53%, and for two genotypes it soared to 70
to 80%. 41 The new use of interferon fundamentally changed the prognosis for
patients diagnosed with hepatitis C, and for ten years-until the development
of protease inhibitors and polymerase inhibitors-it was the standard of
care. 42
The importance of subsequent uses may be illustrated by the fact that in
some therapeutic classes most of the actual use derives from indications ap-
proved later in time. 43 But it is also illustrated by the reverse: medicines ap-
proved for common ailments are sometimes later found useful in treating
"orphan" diseases. An orphan disease affects fewer than 200,000 persons in
the United States (or affects more, but there is no reasonable expectation that
the cost of developing the treatment and making it available could be recov-
ered from sales in the United States). 44 These diseases are considered "or-
phans" because the low revenue expected would ordinarily lead research-in-
tensive companies to look elsewhere. 45 Developing approved medicines for
new orphan uses contributes to the public health simply by addressing the
unmet medical needs of patients suffering from rare diseases. Dozens of med-
icines have been developed for rare diseases after initial FDA approval for a,
more common ailment. To give an example, in 1993, FDA approved Lupron
Depot-Ped (leuprolide acetate) to treat children with central precocious pu-
berty, a rare disease in which puberty begins early, generally under the age
of eight in girls and nine in boys. 46 The agency had originally approved
39 Doris B. Strader, M.D. & Leonard B. Seeff, M.D., A Brief History of the Treatment of Viral
Hepatitis C, I CLIN. LIVER Dis. 6, 6 (2012); FDA, NDA 20-903/S-001, S-002 Approval Letter (undated)
(referencing approval of Rebetron Combination Therapy Pak on June 3, 1998).
40 Strader, supra note 39, at 6; see also Alan Franciscus, Hepatitis C Support Project, HCSP Fact
Sheet: A Brief History of Hepatitis C 3 (2017).
4 1 Emilio Palumbo, Pegylated Interferon and Ribavirin Treatment for Hepatitis C Virus Infection,
2 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES CHRONIC DISEASES 39, 42 (2011) ("Patients infected with HCV genotypes 2
or 3 have a 70-80% likelihood of [a sustained virological response] with a low dose of ribavirin and only
24 weeks of treatment."); PEGASYS PACKAGE INSERT 5 (2003) (noting sustained virologic response to
combination therapy in all patients at 53% and in genotypes 2-6 at 70%).
42 PHRMA, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 38, at 11.
43 Ernst R. Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals, 24
PHARMACOECONOMICS (SuPP. 2D) 69, 81 (2006) (finding that in some classes, 70-80% of total patient
use was attributable to indications developed and approved after the drug first came to market).
44 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2012).
45 As explained in Part 11, we now have special incentives in place to address this market failure.
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Lupron in 1985 for the palliative treatment of advanced prostate cancer, a far
more common disease.47
A new use for an approved drug may offer patients meaningful alterna-
tives to treatments on the market. It might take the drug into a new therapeutic
area, or fundamentally change the treatment paradigm for a common and se-
rious disease, or offer long-sought relief for a previously untreated condition.
No matter how and when it is discovered and developed, a new use of an
approved drug can be profoundly important to patients and physicians.
II. INCENTIVES TO DEVELOP NEW USES
As Part I suggests, the full potential of a new medicine may not be ap-
parent for years after its initial approval. But this continued research requires
time and money. Although the investment required for a new use is generally
less than the investment required to develop a new molecular entity from
scratch, it is still substantial.41 It can take three to six years and between $100
and $300 million to conduct the phase 2 and 3 trials needed to secure FDA
approval of a new use.49 In some cases, it can be much more expensive and
take much longer. For instance, although the premarket trials of Evista sig-
naled its potential use to treat breast cancer, and the first study in breast can-
cer (published two years after the drug's approval in osteoporosis) showed a
47 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1804 (1986). The original product had been a short-acting'sub-
cutaneous injection, but the pediatric product for the new use was a long-acting intramuscular injection
that could be administered monthly. Compare id. with TAP's Lupron Depot-Ped Available Week of April
26, supra note 46.
48 The marketing application holder proposes the new use in a supplement to its original application,
containing the results of new phase 3 studies and usually also new phase 2 studies. It is usually not nec-
essary to reproduce laboratory, animal, or phase I human testing. For example, Abbott's 2007 supplement
to its approved BLA for Humira (adalimumab), proposing treatment of adult patients with moderate to
severe chronic plaque psoriasis, contained data from a phase 2 trial, two phase 3 trials, and four open-
label trials. FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND
BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW sBLA 125057/110 at 2 (2007), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat-
fda docs/nda/2008/1250572110_ClinPharmR.pdf; FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, MEDICAL REVIEW sBLA 125057/110 at 5 (2007), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat-
fda docs/nda/2008/125057s110_MedR PI.pdf; FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH,
PHARMACOLOGY REVIEW sBLA 12057/110 (2007), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda docs/
nda/2008/125057sI 10_PharmR.pdf
49 Grabowski & Moe, supra note 33 (offering the $100 million figure); Roin, Solving the Problem,
supra note 7, at 24 n. 169 (offering the $300 million figure) (citing Alison Sahoo, INDICATION EXPANSION:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT 28 (2007)); see also Said et al., supra note
28, at 6 ("[Post-approval development costs] are likely high and represent an important part of the overall
R&D investment involved in researching and developing new therapeutic biologics."). In 2011, four in-
novators told the Supreme Court in an amicus brief that the cost of developing a new use was 40% less
than the cost of developing a new molecular entity. Brief for Allergan, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae sup-
porting Respondents at * I, Caraco Pharm. Labs. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399 (2012) (No. 10 -844),
2011 WL 5073031.
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secondary end point reduction in breast cancers, FDA required additional
studies." The agency did not approve Evista for its two breast cancer indica-
tions until 2007, after the company had conducted three additional controlled
clinical trials in almost 30,000 women over nearly ten years.51
Patent protection and regulatory exclusivity provide the primary incen-
tives to perform this research. 52 The essence of both is the promise of a period
of time to exploit the innovation without market competition.
First, federal patent law protects new uses of known compositions of
matter. The Patent Act authorizes issuance of a patent for any "new and use-
ful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," subject to the
other requirements of the Act."3 The inventor of a new and nonobvious com-
position may obtain a patent once he or she has identified both the
50 Grabowski & Moe, supra note 33, at 85.
51 FDA, ELI LILLY & Co., LABELING-PACKAGE INSERT NDA 020815 § 14 (2018); FDA, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, Medical Review NDA 22042, CLINICAL TEAM LEADER REVIEW OF
SNDA, at 8 (2007), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda docs/nda/2007/022042s000_MedRP1
.pdf.
52 Some believe that the requirement and benefits of new drug approval provide an incentive to
develop new drugs. Professor Katz has argued, for instance, that FDA's imprimatur adds value to a drug,
enabling a higher market price. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the
Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007); see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at
725 ("FDA regulation fortifies the incentives of firms to invest in generating... socially valuable infor-
mation . . .by requiring the submission of information as a precondition to bringing new products to
market and to making marketing claims about products."). They might also argue that the requirements
and benefits of new-use approval provide a similar incentive. For instance, under current FDA rules, ap-
proval is necessary before a company may promote its drug for a new use, and the agency historically
argued that the prohibition on "off-label promotion" ensures companies will conduct the trials necessary
for new-use approval. E.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998)
amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), and amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Wash. Legal Found v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), and vacated in part,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[T]he dissemination of information demonstrating that a drug is effective
has a positive effect upon sales of the drug. But, if the manufacturer's ability to disseminate any infor-
mation on a new use for a previously approved drug is made wholly contingent upon FDA approval of
that use, the manufacturer will be encouraged, if not compelled, to obtain FDA approval."). Formal ap-
proval may also be necessary for insurance coverage. See Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimburse-
ment, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 396-97 (2009) (reporting that in a study of 179 payers, one quarter
exclude off-label use reimbursement altogether, and half of the remaining payers impose restrictions on
this reimbursement). The response is that the requirement to seek approval is simply a legal barrier to
labeling the drug for the new use in question. The barrier may require the work, but it does nothing to
encourage a firm to invest resources in barrier-overcoming work in the first instance rather than in another
venture altogether. The product's subsequent position in the market must be sufficiently exclusive for the
investment to have been profitable. Professor Eisenberg makes a similar point when she argues that the
premarket approval paradigm for a new drug imposes a high barrier to entry for the company's competi-
tors, which provides a reward for innovation. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of
Patents and Drug Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 119, 121 (2001), https://www.healthaf-
fairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.20.5.119.
53 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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composition and a utility for it.14 The resulting patent generally entitles the
inventor to exclude others from using the composition for all purposes.55 In
1952, Congress amended the statute to state clearly that the term "process"
includes "a new use of a known... machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material."" Thus, the original chemical composition and a later-
discovered nonobvious new use for that composition are distinct patentable
inventions. Put another way, if the inventor subsequently discovers a new
and nonobvious use for the originally patented composition, he or she may
obtain a separate patent for that use."7 That second patent narrowly excludes
54 Id.; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531 (1966) (reinstating decision of patent office that utility
requirement had not been met when novel process yielded intended product but the applicant had failed
to identify any specific and substantial utility for the resulting product); Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853,
856 (CCPA 1980) ("Practical utility is a shorthand way of attributing 'real-world' value to claimed subject
matter.").
15 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (any "use" of a patented composition is an infringing act).
56 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012).
57 Id. A trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases interpreting section 101 of the Patent Act-which
governs eligibility for patents-may cast a shadow of uncertainty on new-use patents. See generally Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
No court has invalidated a patent claiming a new indication for an approved drug, such as treatment of
breast cancer with a drug previously approved for osteoporosis. But courts have invalidated patents claim-
ing new methods of using approved drugs. For instance, in September 2017, a lower court in Delaware
applied the Alice framework to invalidate five patents that claimed methods of using INOmax (nitric ox-
ide). See generally Mallinckrodt Hospital Prods. IP Ltd. v. Praxair Distribution, Inc., No. 15-170-GMS,
2017 WL 3867649 (D. Del. Sept. 5, 2017), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 890 F.3d 1024, 1038 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (ruling solely on the '112 patent). FDA approved INOMax for the treatment of term and near-term
neonates with hypoxic respiratory failure associated with clinical or echocardiographic evidence of pul-
monary hypertension. See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d
1024, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The claims at issue were directed to a method of treating patients with the
product in a way that "reduces the risk that inhalation of nitric oxide gas will induce an increase in pul-
monary capillary wedge pressure ... leading to pulmonary edema." '741 patent col. 14, II. 28-33. The
patent owner argued that this claim recites a new way to use an existing drug, specifically to reduce a
particular adverse event. Mallinckrodt Hospital Prods., No. 15-170-GMS, 2017 WL 3867649, slip op. at
16. The court nevertheless found the claims patent-ineligible, concluding that the effects of the compound
were a matter of human physiology." Id. at 20. Indeed, "[a]ny reaction to treatment with [the compound]
will be a natural phenomenon, dictated by the patient's physiological response to the drug." Id. The claims
recite "routine, conventional activity that does nothing to transform the law of nature" into patentable
subject matter. Id. Although the court wrote that the claims were not "directed to a new way to use an
existing drug," id., this ruling and others applying the Supreme Court's recent 101 jurisprudence to new
drugs may create some uncertainty for innovators about the robustness of the new-use patent incentive.
See, e.g., Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms. v. HEC Pharm. Co., No. 15-cv-5982 (PGS)(TJB) 2016 WL
7177704, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss patent infringement claims because the
claims-relating to the use of certain compounds for treating and/or preventing metabolic diseases-were
directed to patent ineligible subject matter); Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, Nat. Alts. Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, No. 16-cv-02146-H-AGS, 2017 WL
3877808, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017) (invaliding on patent eligibility grounds a patent claiming a
method of using beta-alanine in dietary supplement form to increase anaerobic working capacity in human
subjects and one claiming a method of manufacturing a dietary supplement to increase beta-alanyl
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others from only the newly discovered use, not any other use of the compo-
sition.5
Second, for more than thirty years, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act ("FDCA") has provided three years of regulatory exclusivity for a
new use of a previously approved drug, if approval of the use required clini-
cal data other than bioavailability data.59 This is separate from the five-year
"new chemical entity" ("NCE") exclusivity that may attach when a drug is
first approved. 6 The five-year NCE exclusivity is somewhat analogous to the
original composition of matter patent. And like a new-use patent, new-use
exclusivity protects subsequent innovation. New-use exclusivity prohibits
FDA from approving a generic drug for the new use in question.
The three-year exclusivity provision was added to the pending generic
drug legislation in August 1984 after a group of the country's largest re-
search-based companies expressed concerns about language then under con-
sideration. 6' That language would have provided four years of exclusivity for
new active ingredients first approved after enactment and ten years for new
active ingredients first approved in the two years before enactment.62 The
research-based companies responded in part by explaining the importance of
incremental innovation. They explained that these innovations "frequently
are as important and contribute as much to the public health as the active
ingredients covered under the provision."63 A compromise brokered by Sen-
ator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman in early August resulted
in the addition of exclusivity for all new conditions of use, including new,
indications, supported by clinical data.64
histidine levels in muscle tissues sufficiently to delay onset of fatigue in humans). The author is grateful
to Professor Karshtedt for bringing the beta-alanine case to her attention.
58 Another party could discover and patent the new and nonobvious use, but it would not be able to
use the new discovery without infringing the original inventor's composition patent.
59 21 U.S.C. § 355tj)(5)(F)(iv). Bioavailability refers to "the rate and extent to which an active
ingredient or [active moiety] is absorbed from a drug and becomes available at the site of drug action."
21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b).
60 Biologics receive twelve years of regulatory exclusivity when they are first licensed. 42 U.S.C. §
262(k)(7). Unlike non-biological drugs, they are not eligible for new-use regulatory exclusivity.
61 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S. 2748 Before
the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 108 (1984). Prior to September 1984, federal law did
not provide a statutory pathway for approval of abbreviated applications for generic drugs. Cf H.R. REP.
No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 1 (1984) (creating a stator pathway for approval of abbreviated applications for ge-
neric drugs).
62 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15-16 (1984) (creating a four-year exclusivity period for un-
patentable drugs only).
63 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on H.R. 3605 Before
the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 108 (1984) (statement on behalf of ten companies).
Over the summer, these companies focused mainly on ensuring that new-use approvals in the two-year
transition window from 1982 to 1984 would receive exclusivity. See id.
64 Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 526, 547-48 (1984).
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On the Senate floor, Senator Hatch described the new exclusivity lan-
guage, explaining that new drug applications for new chemical entities would
receive five years of exclusivity going forward, and other applications sup-
ported by clinical data would receive three years.6" He offered an amendment
(which was accepted): additional language that would provide exclusivity for
incremental innovation proposed in supplemental applications after initial
approval.66 This would protect "alterations" to approved drugs-like new in-
dications, he said-"which require considerable time and expense in FDA
required clinical testing. ' 67 In September, when the House considered the
language, Representative Waxman explained that this "period of exclusive
market life" was intended to "encourage drugmakers to obtain FDA approval
for significant therapeutic uses of previously approved drugs. ' 6 If a company
invested money in a new use that was "significant enough to require clinical
tests," the drafters had adopted the "principle" that "we are going to protect
their investment for 3 years," which Representative Waxman viewed as "rea-
sonable."69
Third, since 1983 the FDCA has also offered seven years of regulatory
exclusivity for new drugs and biological products developed to treat rare dis-
eases and conditions.70 Like three-year exclusivity, orphan exclusivity is use
exclusivity. It protects the use, rather than the underlying compound, because
it prohibits FDA approval of another application for the same compound for
the same use.7 Orphan exclusivity is powerful, because it blocks not only
abbreviated applications (for generic drugs and biosimilars) but also full ap-
plications from other innovators who propose the same use. For biologics
innovators who do not have the option of three-year exclusivity for new uses,
orphan exclusivity is the only regulatory exclusivity available for a new in-
dication.
Orphan exclusivity is available not only for a medicine's initial use, but
also for a new use proposed in a supplemental application. And it is available
even if the first approved use was not an orphan indication. Indeed, dozens
65 130 Cong. Rec. 23,765 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
66 Id. at 23,765-66 (adding language that now appears in section 505(j)(5)(F)(iv) of the FDCA).
67 Id. at 23,766.
68 Id. at 24,425.
69 Id. at 24,436 (statement of Rep. Waxman).
70 21 U.S.C. § 36.0cc(a) (2012). As initially enacted, the scheme protected only unpatentable prod-
ucts. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 2, 96 Stat. 2049, 2050-51 (1983). Congress extended the
incentive to all drugs and biologics in 1985. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, § 2,
99 Stat. 387, 387 (1985).
71 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (stating that FDA "may not approve another application .. .or issue
another license" for the same drug for the same disease or condition). See also H.R. REP. No. 97-840, pt.
1, at 9 (1982) ("A drug can be tested and approved for more than one use. Many of the currently marketed
drugs for rare diseases are also used in common diseases. The designation process established by the bill
avoids this confusion by designating the use of the drug which is for a rare disease or condition." (empha-
sis added)).
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of drugs first approved for more common ailments have received orphan ex-
clusivity for later developed uses, including Abraxane (paclitaxel) (first for
breast cancer and eight years later for pancreatic cancer), Halaven (eribulin
mesylate) (first for metastatic breast cancer and six years later for liposar-
coma), and Votrient (pazopanib) (first for renal cell carcinoma and three
years later for advanced soft tissue sarcoma). 72 Offering orphan exclusivity
for new uses of drugs already marketed for common diseases was a deliberate
choice. In a report prepared to inform consideration of the pending orphan
drug legislation, Representative Waxman's subcommittee noted that a mean-
ingful number of drugs are developed first for a common condition and only
later for an orphan indication. 73
Patent protection for new uses, three-year regulatory exclusivity for new
uses, and seven-year regulatory exclusivity for new orphan uses have the
same goal and are similar in how they are intended to operate. All are meant
as incentives for new-use innovation. Each provides an incentive by promis-
ing a period of time during which a company's competitors will not benefit
from sales of their own versions of the medicine for the use in question. Each
erects a temporary legal barrier to competition so the new use is excludable
for a time. None are intended to prevent the company's competitors from
marketing the underlying compound for another use (provided any relevant
patents and exclusivity have expired or a license has been paid). And, as writ-
ten, none should have this broader effect; each is tailored to protect only the
new use in question.
III. THE VOIDING OF NEW-USE PATENTS AND EXCLUSIVITY
Patent protection, three-year exclusivity, and orphan exclusivity are
meant to operate as temporary barriers to market entry, but in practice they
do not work this way. Drug innovators lose new-use sales to their generic
competitors. This stems from a pernicious combination of FDA policies and
practices, state laws, and prescriber, generic industry, and payer practices,
none of which are necessary for patients and payers to benefit from generic
copies of no-longer-protected drugs and uses. Moreover, under current law it
is nearly impossible for drug innovators to prevent these sales or obtain relief
after the fact.
72 FDA, Abraxane NDA 21-660 Approval Letter (2005); FDA, Abraxane NDA 21660/S-037 Sup-
plement Approval Letter (2013); FDA, Halaven NDA 201532 Approval Letter (2010); FDA, Halaven
NDA 201532/S-015 Supplement Approval Letter (2016); FDA, Votrient NDA 022465 Approval Letter
(2009); FDA, Votrient NDA 022465/S-010/S-012/PMR 1549-5 Supplement Approval Letter (2012).
73 See H.R. Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., Preliminary Report: Survey on Drugs for Rare Disease 7 (1982) (Comm. Print 97-
BB).
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Biologics innovators may similarly lose new-use sales to their biosimi-
lar competitors, but the framework for biosimilars is new, and we know very
little still about innovation and competition in the biosimilar marketplace.7 4
The incentives for new-use innovation are different, however, as already
noted. For instance, although biologics innovators are eligible for seven-year
new-use orphan exclusivity, they are not eligible for three-year regulatory
exclusivity for ordinary new uses. The rules governing approval ofbiosimilar
biologics are different, and the markets are likely to function very differ-
ently.75 Some of the factors that contribute to the voiding of new-use patents
and new-use regulatory exclusivity for drugs are likely to apply equally to
new-use patents and regulatory exclusivity for biologics, but exploring the
likely differences is beyond the scope of this Article. And it may be prema-
ture, because FDA has approved only a handful of biosimilar biologics (and
no interchangeable biologics). The discussion below focuses primarily on
new uses for drugs.
A. Practices and Policies that Undermine Patents and Regulatory Exclu-
sivity
FDA decided decades ago that the regulatory provisions of the FDCA
authorize approval of a generic drug with labeling that omits indications pro-
tected by exclusivity or patent.7 6 The omission is called a "carve-out," and
the resulting generic labeling is called partial labeling, or sometimes "skinny
labeling" or "carved-out labeling." When Bristol-Myers Squibb ("BMS")
faced generic versions of Capoten (captopril) labeled only for hypertension,
with two exclusivity-protected indications carved out, the company argued-
not unreasonably-that FDA's decision was not authorized by the statute. 77
The statute requires the labeling of a generic drug to be the "same" as the
labeling of the corresponding innovative drug.78 The statute makes two ex-
ceptions, neither of which appears to cover omissions due to patents or ex-
clusivity. 79 Specifically, the same-labeling provision permits differences
74 See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 926, 928, 937, 939.
71 See id. at 894.
76 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2017) ("Labeling ... proposed for the drug product must be
the same as the labeling approved for the reference listed drug, except for... omission of an indication
or other aspect of labeling . . . accorded exclusivity under § 505(j)(5)(F).").
77 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
78 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (generally requiring application to contain information to
show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug);
id. § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii) (listing lack of same labeling as a ground for refusal to approve a generic applica-
tion).
79 Id. § 3550)(2)(A)(v) (permitting "changes required because of differences approved under a [suit-
ability petition] or because the [generic] drug and the [innovative] drug are produced or distributed by
different manufacturers").
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needed because FDA allowed the generic company to change its route of
administration, dosage form, strength, or one of multiple active ingredients.
It also permits differences "required" because the drugs are produced or dis-
tributed by different companies.8 The former authorizes only specific listed
differences, which do not include differences in approved indications. The
latter arguably does not authorize differences due to patent or exclusivity,
because a difference in the companies does not "require" different labeling
in that situation. After all, the generic company could seek a license from the
patent or exclusivity holder to label its product with the protected use.
FDA nevertheless decided that the plain language of the statutory same-
labeling provision permitted generic captopril applicants to omit indications
for which BMS held exclusivity.8 The agency further relied on a 1984 report
from the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which stated that the
proposed legislation "permits [a generic drug] to be approved for less than
all of the indications for which the listed drug has been approved."82 This
passage relates to patented uses and appears in a summary of the generic drug
bill as it stood in June 1984, before the bill was amended to provide regula-
tory exclusivity for new uses. The D.C. Circuit, reviewing FDA's decision,
was not persuaded that the timing mattered and concluded that FDA's ap-
proach of permitting exclusivity carve-outs "finds unusually strong support
in the legislative history."8 3 The court reasoned that Congress must have
added the new-use exclusivity provision understanding that the generic ap-
proval provisions would not prevent approval of partial labeling. Thus, FDA
could approve generic versions of Capoten for hypertension, despite the fact
that BMS held exclusivity for diabetic nephropathy and left ventricular dys-
function following myocardial infarction. As a result, it has been clear since
1996 that neither new-use exclusivity nor new-use patent protection protects
an innovator from a generic copy that is labeled only for unprotected indica-
tions. FDA also applies this policy to biosimilar biologics, even though they
are not subject to a statutory "same labeling" requirement in the first in-
stance.8 4 For example, it allowed Amgen to omit three indications and a
80 Id.
81 Brief for Appellees at 29, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(No. 95-5399).
82 Id. at 29-30 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2654-
55). This discussion in the legislative history relates to a statutory provision that contemplates generic
applicants choosing not to seek approval for some uses protected bypatent. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(viii)
(2012) (allowing a generic applicant to include, in its application, a statement that a method of use patent
listed in the Orange Book does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking approval). Neither the
statute nor the legislative history explains how this provision is to be reconciled with a same-labeling
requirement that contains no exception for avoidance of patents.
83 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
84 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (requirement that a generic application show that the ge-
neric labeling is the same as the reference listed drug labeling) with 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i) (2012)
(requirements for a biosimilar application, which do not include this requirement). See also U.S. FOOD &
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patient population for a fourth indication from the labeling of Amjevita (ada-
limumab-atto), its biosimilar of Humira (adalimumab)."5
The fact that in a particular case a generic may be dispensed almost ex-
clusively for the protected use does not change FDA's approach and has not
swayed the courts. This became clear in a 2002 case involving
levocarnitine. 6 The innovator first secured approval for metabolism errors
and later obtained approval for end stage renal disease ("ESRD"). Its product
was available in oral dosage forms and an injectable form, but only the in-
jectable form was approved for treatment of ESRD. Moreover, over 80% of
the sales of the injectable product were for ESRD. FDA approved two generic
drugs while the innovator held orphan exclusivity for ESRD, even though the
generic companies planned to market only the injectable form of the product.
In other words, it was unavoidable (and probably intended) that the generic
drugs would be used primarily for the use that was protected and that had
been omitted from their labeling. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, clearing the
path for generic companies to sell products that everyone understood would
mostly be used for an indication for which another company was entitled to
exclusive sales. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute per-
mitted approval.17
This outcome is troubling because FDA could have refused the ap-
proval. The agency's orphan drug regulations preclude approval of a second
drug "intended for the same use" during the exclusivity term, and the
agency's intended use regulation authorizes it to consider "the circumstances
that the article is, with the knowledge of the [applicant], offered and used for
a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised."8 8 No court had ever
found a product's intended use without relying on the manufacturer's express
claims, however, and FDA declined to do so here.8 9 The agency has also re-
jected arguments that a generic drug in this situation-likely to be used for
an indication carved out of its labeling-is "misbranded" under sections
DRUG ADMIN. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009 8 (2015) 8
("[A] biosimilar applicant generally may obtain licensure for fewer than all conditions of use for which
the reference product is licensed.").
85 Amgen omitted pediatric Crohn's disease, hidradenitis suppurativa, uveitis, and juvenile idio-
pathic arthritis for patients between the ages of two and four. Compare HUMIRA PACKAGE INSERT § 1
(2016) with AMJEVITA PACKAGE INSERT § 1 (2016).
86 Sigma-Tau Pharm. Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 147 148 (4th Cir. 2002).
87 Id. at 144-45.
88 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2017). The orphan drug regulations explain that during the exclusivity term,
FDA will not approve another company's marketing application "for the same drug" for the same use. 21
C.F.R. § 316.31 (2017). They also define "same drug" for purposes of orphan drug exclusivity for small
molecule drugs to mean "a drug that contains the same active moiety as a previously approved drug and
is intended for the same use as the previously approved drug." 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(i).
89 The court deferred to FDA's interpretation and application of its regulations. Sigma-Tau, 288
F.3d at 146.
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502(a) and 20 1(n) of the act because its labeling omits facts that are "material
with respect to consequences which may result from ... conditions of use as
are customary or usual." 9
As a result of the agency decisions and court cases just described, the
agency's partial labeling policy is settled law.91 Thus, as a general rule, sub-
sequent innovation by an innovator does not block prompt approval of an-
other company's application once the compound patent and regulatory ex-
clusivity have expired and the initial indication is no longer protected. In the-
ory, the generic company may sell its product for the unprotected uses, and
the innovator will still enjoy exclusive sales for the protected uses. That is,
after all, the purpose of the innovator's new-use patent and regulatory exclu-
sivity. But exclusive sales turn out to be impossible.
Not only will FDA approve a generic drug that omits a protected indi-
cation from its labeling, but the agency will also deem that generic drug
"therapeutically equivalent" to the innovator's product. In the 1970s, the
states began to adopt laws and regulations to encourage or require the substi-
tution of less expensive drug products for brand products that had been pre-
scribed. 92 These states asked FDA for assistance in preparing formularies that
would list the drugs that were, or were not, substitutable.93 The agency re-
sponded in 1979 with a draft list of all prescription drugs approved as safe
and effective, along with "therapeutic equivalence" decisions for any distrib-
uted by more than one company. 94 The basic idea was that two products
deemed therapeutically equivalent could be substituted for each other, "with
the full expectation that the substituted product will produce the same clinical
90 21 U.S.C §§ 321(n), 352(a) (2012). This arose in connection with Marinol (dronabinol), a syn-
thetic cannabinoid approved for treatment of nausea and vomiting associated with cancer chemotherapy
and for treatment of appetite loss associated with weight loss in patients with AIDS. In 2007, generic
applicants sought approval without the patent-protected AIDS indication. See Solvay Pet. at 2, Docket
No. FDA-2007-P-0169 (Oct. 25, 2007). The NDA holder, Solvay, pointed out that two-thirds of the pa-
tients receiving Marinol were AIDS patients and that omitting the AIDS indication also necessarily en-
tailed omitting information about daily dose, timing of administration, duration of treatment, and central
nervous system adverse events for these patients. Id. at 3-6. This, Solvay argued, meant the labeling would
omit facts that were material with respect to a customary or usual use. Id. at 2. The FDA was unwilling to
consider the likely off-label use, because doing so would "nullify" the provisions of the statute that it had
already interpreted to permit carve-outs. FDA Letter to Solvay Pharmaceuticals 10, Docket No. FDA-
2007-P-0169 (Apr. 25, 2008).
91 There is one exception to the partial labeling policy, which rarely applies (i.e. if a generic drug
would be less safe and effective than the innovative drug for its labeled uses, the carve-out is not permit-
ted). 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7). In this case, FDA cannot approve the generic drug until the relevant patent
and regulatory exclusivity expire or the generic company obtains a license. See id.
92 Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 49 (1979).
93 FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at iv (38th
ed. 2018) [hereinafter 38TH ORANGE BOOK].
94 Id.
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effect and safety profile as the prescribed product."95 FDA finalized the list
in October 1980, publishing it in a paperback known in the industry as the
Orange Book.96 Since then, the agency has issued monthly supplements and
reissued the book in its entirety once a year. Today the Orange Book, now in
its 38th edition, is also available as a searchable database on the agency's
website. 97
When making therapeutic equivalence determinations, FDA does not
consider the scope of a drug's approval. Instead, as the preface to the Orange
Book explains, the agency deems two products therapeutic equivalents (des-
ignates them as "AB rated") if they are pharmaceutical "equivalents for
which bioequivalence has been demonstrated."9 Two products are "pharma-
ceutical equivalents if they [have] the same active ingredients, ... route of
administration," dosage form, and strength. 99 Two products are bioequivalent
if they are pharmaceutical equivalents (or alternatives 100) and display compa-
rable bioavailability "under sinmilar experimental conditions."''0 Put another
way, FDA defines therapeutic equivalence as a function of tangible product
features and bioavailability in the body, not the scope of regulatory approval.
The agency has structured the Orange Book to avoid limiting the scope
of its advice to approved indications. The publication does not differentiate
between generic drugs approved for all the innovative drug's indications and
generic drugs that lack some indications.'02 Therapeutic equivalence ratings
do not indicate that the therapeutic equivalence decision refers only to the
approved indications or to certain specific indications. FDA recently aban-
doned a modest caveat about unapproved uses that it previously included in
the Orange Book. From 1996 through 2016, the preface stated that
95 Id. at vii-viii.
96 Id. at v. After enactment of the generic drug legislation in 1984, the agency added information
about each drug's unexpired patents and regulatory exclusivity. See FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (6th ed. 1985).
97 See FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfin.
98 38TH ORANGE BOOK, supra note 93, at vii. FDA uses a variety of"A" codes to designate thera-
peutic equivalence: AA, AN, AO, AP, and AT ("depending on the dosage form") for drugs as to which
"there are no known or suspected bioequivalence problems," and AB for drugs as to which "actual or
potential bioequivalence problems have been resolved with adequate in vivo and/or in vitro evidence." Id.
at xiii. This Article simply refers to "AB" rating, for therapeutic equivalence, which is the convention.
99 Id. at vii.
100 Pharmaceutical alternatives have "the same therapeutic moiety, but [either have] different salts,
esters, or complexes of that moiety, or [have] different dosage forms or strengths." Id.
101 Id. at viii. For instance, two drugs are bioequivalent if there is not "a significant difference in the
rate and extent" of their absorption "when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingre-
dient under similar experimental conditions." Id.
102 The Orange Book does not specify the indications for which a drug is approved. One would have
to determine this from the labeling. The brand labeling is usually available on FDA's website, but often
the generic labeling is not.
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therapeutic equivalence decisions "are not made for unapproved, off-label
uses." 10 3 In the 2017 edition, however, the agency deleted this proviso with-
out comment. In short, for the more than thirty years that FDA has published
the Orange Book, it has provided a flat AB rating once a generic drug is
approved.
FDA did not need to take this "generic for one use, generic for all uses"
approach. The agency invented the concept of therapeutic equivalence before
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments permitting approval of
generic drugs. The statute says nothing about providing therapeutic equiva-
lence ratings, and the agency could stop providing these ratings--or change
the system entirely-without legislative action. Moreover, the current lan-
guage in the Orange Book provides a basis for considering the scope of ge-
neric approval when issuing AB ratings. For instance, it states that two prod-
ucts must be "adequately labeled" to be therapeutically equivalent. 14 It also
states that therapeutic equivalents "can be expected to have the same clinical
effect and safety profile when administered to patients under the conditions
specified in the labeling."' 5 Both passages provide a basis for indication-
specific ratings. But FDA has never taken the position that the two must be
labeled for the same uses to be deemed therapeutically equivalent. Instead, it
provides an AB rating to a bioequivalent and pharmaceutically equivalent
generic drug that omits protected uses from its labeling. The preface explains
that such a generic "can be substituted with the full expectation that [it] will
produce the same clinical effect and safety profile as the prescribed prod-,
uct." 106
FDA's decision to provide a blanket AB rating means that as a general
rule the generic drug will be dispensed whenever the innovator's drug is pre-
scribed, including for new uses under patent protection or regulatory exclu-
sivity. This is because FDA's therapeutic equivalence decisions facilitate,
and in some cases trigger, substitution under state pharmacy law. Although
the precise wording varies, in every state the law authorizes (and in some
cases, it requires) a pharmacist to substitute a therapeutically equivalent ge-
neric drug when filling a prescription for a brand product. 107 State medical
practice laws do not require a physician to specify the patient's condition or
the intended use of a medicine on the prescription form. State pharmacy acts
and pharmacy board regulations generally do not require a pharmacist to in-
quire about the patient's condition or the intended use of a prescribed drug
103 E.g., FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at
vii (36th ed. 2016).
104 38TH ORANGE BOOK, supra note 93, at vii.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 644-45 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Alt-
hough the specific terms of these laws vary by state, drug substitution laws either permit or require phar-
macists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent
express direction from the prescribing physician that the prescription must be dispensed as written.").
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or to verify that a generic drug is approved for the use before substituting the
generic drug for the innovative drug prescribed. Payers generally require sub-
stitution of a drug that is both bioequivalent and pharmaceutically equivalent
without regard to the patient's condition or the scope of the dispensed drug's
approval. 0"
By shifting sales to the generic product even for a new use, state laws
and payer policies allow generic drugs to flow past the temporary barrier to
entry created by federal patent law and regulatory exclusivity law. FDA's
blanket approach to AB ratings makes this possible, in part by eliminating
any incentive for the generic company to seek a license from the innovator.
If a generic company paid the innovator for a license to label its drug for the
protected use, the generic drug would be approved for the use and listed as
AB-rated. But if the generic company declined to pay for a license, its generic
drug, despite lacking approval for the use, would also be listed as AB-rated.
State law and payer policies would lead to substitution in either case. Absent
a meaningful risk of liability for these sales, the generic company has no in-
centive to seek a license. "09
If automatic substitution does not lead to infringing sale and use,-pre-
scribing decisions may nevertheless still do so. That is, a healthcare provider
might select a generic drug or a biosimilar biologic for an unapproved use
for which the innovator holds approval and a new-use patent or regulatory
exclusivity. FDA generally does not step in when healthcare professionals
prescribe drugs for unapproved uses. "10 Its practice of medicine policy states
that once a new drug (which includes a generic drug) is in a local pharmacy
after interstate shipment, "the physician may, as part of the practice of med-
icine, lawfully . . . vary the conditions of use from those approved in the
108 See, e.g., BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER HEALTHNET PLAN, PHARMACY POLICY: MANDATORY
GENERIC SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.bmchp.org/-/media/e5e4b I6fbc4I4928
abc005786257714f.pdf (stating that once FDA has granted an A rating to the generic drug, the plan will
cover the brand product only if the patient has an allergy to an inactive ingredient in the generic drug or
the patient has not responded adequately to at least two other covered drugs in the same class). State health
insurance laws do not require a different approach. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 17B:27F-3 (2017) (requir-
ing only that a pharmacy benefit manager determine that the drug is listed as therapeutically and pharma-'
ceutically equivalent in the ORANGE BOOK).
109 The same thing may happen once FDA starts to approve interchangeable biologics. Biosimilar
biologics are not substitutable. Instead, "interchangeable biologics"-subject to a different approval
standard-are substitutable. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4) (2012) (stating the approval standard for interchange-
able biologics); § 262(i)(3) (stating that interchangeable biologics "may be substituted for" the corre-
sponding innovative product "without the intervention of' the prescriber). FDA has approved biosimilar
biologics with patent-protected and orphan-exclusivity-protected uses omitted from their labeling, and
although the question is not yet resolved it may decide to approve interchangeable biologics with partial
labeling. In this case, pharmacists might substitute the interchangeable biologic for the prescribed inno-
vative product, even though the innovator was meant to have exclusive sales for the use in question.
110 There is one exception. Section 333(e) of the FDCA makes it a felony to distribute human growth
hormone (including by administering it directly to a patient) for a use that FDA has not approved. See 21
U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012).
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package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of the Food and
Drug Administration." I State laws also generally permit physicians to pre-
scribe approved drugs for unapproved uses. " 2
FDA's practice of medicine policy arose to accommodate use of inno-
vative products beyond the scope of their labeling. It acknowledges that the
standard of care may move more quickly than federal regulators." 3 It also
acknowledges that it may be appropriate for a healthcare professional to
choose an investigational use of an approved medicine when in his or her
clinical judgment-and with the patient's consent-that use is in the patient's
best interest. 14 On the whole, it is a sound policy. The problem comes from
extending the policy to prescribing a generic drug or biosimilar for an unap-
proved use simply because the innovator's product (which is approved for
that use) is more expensive. While using the innovator's product for the new
use may raise affordability issues, the prospect of financial reward from mar-
ket exclusivity provided the incentive to develop the new use in the first in-
stance. If we are committed to the patent and exclusivity laws as they are
currently written and intended to function, then off-label prescribing for in-
fringing uses to save money-to avoid exclusivity-is a problem.
Yet prescribers receive encouragement and even instructions about in-
fringing uses of generic drugs and biosimilars. The most significant source
is what might be called a "noisy carve-out." Thanks to recent amendments to
the FDCA, if an innovator's patent or regulatory exclusivity precludes ap-
proval of a generic drug for a new pediatric indication, the generic drug's
labeling may nevertheless signal its safety and effectiveness for the
11 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972). Regulating the practice of medicine generally falls to the
states. Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427,
430-31 (2015) ("[T]he conventional wisdom among courts, lawmakers, and administrative agencies is
that states regulate medical practice, while the federal government regulates medical products." (emphasis
omitted)).
112 See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False
Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 61, 68 (2008) ("State liability stand-
ards ... generally do not place the physician at significantly increased risk of liability for off-label pre-
scribing per se.").
113 See, e.g., PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 814 (4th ed. 2014). Indeed, off-
label use may be recommended by applicable clinical guidelines. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-
Label Drug Use: Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
114 See FDA, MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 17 (2017) ("Health care providers prescribe and use medi-
cal products for unapproved uses when they judge that the unapproved use is medically appropriate for
their particular patients-whose characteristics and needs may differ from the characteristics of the pop-
ulation studied for the approved/cleared uses. This practice may be most common in patients with diseases
for which there is no proven treatment, or in patients who have exhausted all approved/cleared treat-
ments.").
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indication." 5 The labeling may say that "because of marketing exclusivity"
held by another company (and thus, presumably, for no other reason) the ge-
neric drug is "not labeled for pediatric use." The labeling may even provide
instructions for the indication in question-any "information" that FDA con-
siders necessary for safe use. The labeling is, in short, noisy about the omitted
new use. The agency has also started to implement noisy carve-outs in situa-
tions not authorized by this statutory provision. For instance, the labeling for
Inflectra (infliximab-dyyb) omits pediatric ulcerative colitis, for which the
innovator holds orphan exclusivity. Rather than merely approve partial label-
ing that omitted this use, FDA approved a noisy carve-out that effectively
tells prescribers that Inflecta is safe and effective for the omitted (and pro-
tected) indication. 116
B. Impediments to Solving the Problem
The factors just described work together to effect an end result that is
inconsistent with the objectives of federal law. The law intends drug compa-
nies to have exclusive sales for the new uses they develop. But partial label-
ing to respect protected uses is functionally irrelevant when FDA deems a
generic drug AB-rated to the innovator's drug in the Orange Book, without
regard for the scope of its approval. State pharmacy substitution laws and
payer policies exacerbate the problem by authorizing or requiring the substi-
tution of a therapeutically equivalent generic for the innovator's drug, with-
out regard for the scope of the generic drug's approval. Thus, if the physician
prescribes the innovator's product for the new use, state law and payer poli-
cies will generally lead to dispensing of the generic product anyway. Even if
state law and payer policies do not override the exclusivity, state law gener-
ally permits physicians to prescribe generic drugs and biosimilar biologics
for any use, including an unapproved use, for which another company holds
a patent or exclusivity. FDA will not interfere with this, considering it the
practice of medicine. Indeed, the agency affirmatively undermines pediatric
new-use patents and exclusivity by using noisy carve outs in generic and bi-
osimilar labeling. The initial goal was for the innovator alone to enjoy sales
115 See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(o)(2) (2012). As explained above, FDA's regulations permit generic drug
labeling to omit an indication protected by patent or exclusivity, unless the generic drug would be less
safe or effective than the innovator drug for the remaining, non-protected conditions of use. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.127(a)(7) (2017). Section 505A(o) authorizes an exception if the omitted information is pediatric
information protected by three-year exclusivity, orphan exclusivity, or an extension of one of those ex-
clusivities under a special provision for antibiotics. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(o)(2). In this situation, FDA
may approve the generic drug with the pediatric information omitted, even if the resulting labeling would
make the generic drug less safe or effective.
116 See INFLECTRA PACKAGE INSERT § 8.4 (2016). Section 505A(o), which refers only to generic
drug applications and not biosimilar applications, did not authorize this.
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of the drug for the use in question. But in the end, the generic and biosimilar
companies will take most of the sales. I I7
This problem cannot be solved through persuasion alone. Consider the
challenge of persuading a physician to override substitution when prescribing
an innovative drug for a newly approved use. Most state laws permit the phy-
sician to do so, for instance by writing "dispense as written" on the prescrip-
tion form." 8 But if FDA has deemed the generic drug therapeutically equiv-
alent, the treating physician understands that as a clinical matter the two
drugs are not distinguishable. She has no medical reason to write "dispense
as written" on the prescription. Nor does the patient have any reason to insist
on the innovative product, which may have a higher copayment. Even if the
physician and patient know that the research in question needs to be paid for,
and that further new-use innovations will be jeopardized unless patients re-
ceive and payers cover the innovator's product for the protected new use,
they are unlikely to select the more expensive of two clinically identical op-
tions. After all, doing nothing-acquiescing in the substitution that is the de-
fault in this situation-shifts the financial responsibility to another patient
and payer. And if everyone behaves in this way, there is a classic tragedy of
the commons: each acts according to his or her self-interest but contrary to
the common good by spoiling the resource (here, the incentive for new-use
research).
As a practical matter, it is exceptionally difficult for innovators to obtain
judicial relief enforcing exclusivity in these situations. Public law appears to
offer very little relief. The regulatory exclusivity provisions of the FDCA
block FDA from approving other applications, and the agency avoids a vio-
lation by approving partial labeling. Regulatory exclusivity does not bind an-
yone other than the agency, so-for instance-it does not block a competitor
117 This is not an empirical claim; it is a structural point. Prescribers generally do not record medical
conditions on prescriptions, and pharmacists and pharmacy benefit managers usually do not inquire about
the patient's condition. But substitution occurs automatically under state law. See generally
PHARMACIST'S LETTER, STATE REGULATIONS ON GENERIC SUBSTITUTION (2009), http://pharmacistslet-
ter.therapeuticresearch.com/pl/ArticleDD.aspx?nidchk=l &cs=&s=PL&pt=2&fpt-2&dd=220901#
CHART 1186 (outlining laws governing the substitution of generics in each state). That is, if the prescrip-
tion states the brand product, the pharmacy substitutes the generic. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that in Geor-
gia, "[a] pharmacist may substitute a drug with the same generic name in the same strength, quantity,
dose, and dosage form as the prescribed brand name drug product"). Unless there is reason to think that
physicians, pharmacists, or payers step in to prevent generic substitution specifically for protected uses,
if an innovator knows that fifty percent of the prescriptions for its product are for a particular indication,
then fifty percent of the generic sales will be for that indication.
In rare cases, a new use may be associated with a new and tangible product feature-such as a new route
of administration-that is itself protected by a patent or regulatory exclusivity. In these cases, the new use
may be indirectly excludable, because the generic drug will not be approved in the particular physical
form required.
1i8 E.g., IND. CODE. 16-42-22-6 (2017).
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from marketing or selling its product for the use. 111 Nor does a new-use patent
block FDA from approving a competitor's application for a drug that every-
one understands will be dispensed for the protected use. If a generic company
omits the use from its labeling, the patent has no bearing on FDA's authority
to approve the generic drug.' 20 The courts allow FDA to approve generic
drugs with partial labeling even when the generic company realizes (and per-
haps intends) that the vast majority of the sales will be infringing.
Private law solutions have not borne much fruit to date. As Professor
Eisenberg explained in 2005, patent infringement cases face substantial chal-
lenges.' 2' Although a patent infringement suit is theoretically possible, the
patient-a direct infringer-is not an appealing defendant. 22 Nor is the phy-
sician or the payer. Although the physician might have direct liability, and
both the physician and payer might face secondary liability, the innovator's
119 Other laws-including FDA's rules prohibiting promotion of an approved drug for an unap-
proved use-might prohibit the competitor from doing so. FDA proceeds against off-label promotion of
prescription drugs using a complex theory that weaves together several statutory and regulatory provi-
sions. Section 502(f)(1) of the FDCA deems a drug misbranded unless its labeling bears adequate direc-
tions for use. 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1). FDA interprets this to mean adequate directions for lay use, 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.5, which makes prescription drugs misbranded by default. Section 502(f)(1) allows FDA to exempt
drugs from its provisions by regulation, however, and the agency has done so for prescription drugs. Sec-
tion 201.100 of the agency's regulations exempts a prescription drug from section 502(f)(1) if, among
other things, (1) the package insert bears "adequate information for its use" such that prescribers can use
the drug for its intended purposes including all purposes for which the drug is advertised, and (2) if the
drug is a new drug, this is the labeling approved with the new drug application. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c).
Further, all labeling that discusses use of the drug-thus including written, printed, or graphic promotional
pieces, see 21 U.S.C. § 321 (m)-must provide adequate information for prescribers for all intended uses
and advertised use, and all parts of that labeling must be "consistent with and not contrary to" the approved
labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1). In addition, FDA's regulations also provide that the intended use of
a drug can be based on labeling claims and advertising material, among other things, and also oral state-
ments. 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. Finally, the FDCA defines a "new drug" as a drug that is not generally rec-
ognized as safe and effective for the conditions suggested in its labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p). These stat-
utory and regulatory provisions work together as follows. If the NDA holder promotes its drug for an
unapproved use, it creates a new intended use. If the labeling does not contain adequate information about
that use, then the manufacturer violates section 201.100 of FDA's regulations. If it violates section
201.100, then itno longer qualifies for the exemption from section 502(f)(1)of the FDCA, and its drug is
misbranded. If the company instead unilaterally changes its labeling to provide information about the use,
then it also turns its product into an unapproved new drug with respect to that use.
120 If the generic company wants to include the new use in its labeling, the statute does block FDA
from approving the generic drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2012) (delaying approval of a generic appli-
cation if the applicant chooses to wait for expiry of a new-use patent or challenge a new-patent, but not if
the applicant chooses to omit the patented use from its labeling); id. § 3550)(2)(A)(viii) (allowing generic
applicant to omit a patented use from its labeling by providing a "section viii" statement to the patent
owner). In contrast, new-use patents never affect FDA's authority to approve biosimilar biologics. There
is no statutory link between a biologic innovator's patents and FDA's authority to approve biosimilar or
interchangeable biologics. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 933-34.
121 See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 724; Roin, supra note 7, at 36 n.258.
122 In this context direct infringement means using the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2012).
The patient might infringe directly by taking the medicine for the patented use.
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success in the marketplace depends on prescriptions from physicians and
contracts with payers.' 23 Under current law, it can be very hard to establish
that a generic company induced infringement of a patent claiming a protected
use omitted from the labeling. The statute specifies liability if the generic
company "actively" induced infringement. But the Hatch-Waxman scheme
for generic drug approval ensures that most patent litigation against generic
companies occurs prior to generic drug launch. 12 4 In this prelaunch scenario,
knowledge that a generic drug will be dispensed for an unapproved use, and
even intent that it be dispensed for the use, are usually not enough to show
123 Depending on how the claims were drafted, a physician might directly infringe by administering
the drug for the patented use.
Secondary liability for healthcare professionals and the payer would presumably be grounded in induced
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
as an infringer.") For instance, a physician might infringe by providing instructions to the patient to use
the generic drug in a way that infringed the innovator's patent.'A pharmacist might infringe by dispensing
a generic drug for a patient's infringing use, with instructions for that use. A payer might infringe by
steering its covered patients to approved generic drugs with labeling carve-outs, through a blanket substi-
tution requirement and preferential co-payments. See Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm.
Corp., 785 F.3d 625, 630-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that inducement can be found if there is "' [c]vidence
of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement,"' such as "instructing how to engage in an infring-
ing use" (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokstcr, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005)) (alter-
ation in original)).
But inducement theories face challenges. Although section 271(b) does not refer to the inducer's
knowledge or purpose, U.S. courts generally require some degree of knowledge and intent. How much
they do (and should) require remains unclear and disputed. E.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,
316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[S]pecific intent and action to induce infringement must be
proven."); see also Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 225, 226
(2005) ("[T]he actual requirements for inducement liability have remained something of mystery.").
As a practical matter, pharmaceutical patent owners do not sue physicians, pharmacists, or payers for
induced infringement; they sue generic companies. See Brief for AbbVie Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 2, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896) ("But
it is impossible, as a practical matter, to enforce [method of use] patents by suing for direct infringement.
After all, the only people who actually use Compound X to treat Disease Y are doctors and patients. But
it would be both impractical and contrary to public policy for pharmaceutical companies to sue thousands
of doctors and patients individually."). As a result, there is very little judicial discussion of induced in-
fringement theory with respect to these other market participants-and even less scholarship. Recent de-
velopments in Europe could invigorate the discussion. In November 2017 the Dutch Supreme Court held
that a company could be liable for induced infringement of a new-use patent if the infringing use is fore-
seeable-that is, if it offers or delivers the generic drug to people who lack a license to use the drug in
this way, ifit knows or it should be obvious under the circumstances that the drug is suitable for and will
be used for the patented use. HR 3 Nov. 2017, RvdW 2017, 1170 3.6.1-3.6.6 (Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp./Teva) (Neth.), https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2807; Bert
Oosting et al., Dutch Supreme Court Hands Down Landmark Decision on Infringement of Second Medical
Use Patents, LiMEGREEN IP NEwS (Nov. 13, 2017).
124 The Hatch-Waxman Amendments created an artificial act of direct infringement-submission of
a generic drug application seeking permission to market the drug during the term of an unexpired patent.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2)(A) (2012). This creates federal court jurisdiction for the patent infringement case
prior to FDA approval and market launch.
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active inducement. 25 An induced infringement claim in the postlaunch set-
ting currently requires not only proof of direct infringement, but also proof
that the generic company took affirmative actions intended to cause this di-
rect infringement and proof that the inducement (instead of other factors)
caused the direct infringement. 2 6 Successful cases are rare. 27 In an excep-
tional case, the innovator might be able to invoke a contributory infringement
theory, but the statute permits recovery only if the generic drug is not suitable
for substantial noninfringing use. 2
More work could be done on solutions to the new-use problem using
currently available legal doctrines. For example, if a generic or biosimilar
company obtained approval of its product on the basis of an innovator's mar-
keting application and then courted sales of its product for a use still protected
by the innovator's regulatory exclusivity, there might be room for arguments
grounded in misappropriation, conversion, or unfair competition. 29 It may
also be worth considering whether state laws are preempted when they re-
quire substitution of generic drugs that, when substituted, lead to infringe-
ment of patents issued by the federal government. 3 0 These theories have not
been fully explored to date by litigants or, indeed, by scholars.
125 E.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) when asserted patent was for a use for which the generic drug
was not approved, also finding no inducement under § 271(b) before launch because there was no evidence
the generic company would encourage or promote doctors to prescribe, or pharmacists to dispense, its
drug in a manner that would infringe the patent).
126 E.g., Final Jury Instructions at 26, GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 313
F.Supp.3d 582 (D. Del. Mar. 8,2018) (No. 14-878-LPS-CJB).
127 In a rare example, Teva was ordered to pay GlaxoSmithKline $235 million for inducing infringe-
ment of a use patent covering Coreg (carvedilol). Jury Verdict at 8, GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharm.
USA Inc., 313 F.Supp.3d 582 (D. Del. Mar. 8,2018) (No. 14-878-LPS-CJB); Nate Raymond, GSK Wins
$235 million from Teva in Coreg Patent Trial, REUTERS (June 21, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-gsk-teva-pharm-ind-idUSK-BN19C32B. The court later entered judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant, on the theory that GSK failed to prove Teva's actions, as opposed to other factors,
caused the physicians to directly infringe the patent. Memorandum Opinion at 2, GlaxoSmithKline LLC
v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 313 F.Supp.3d 582 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2018) (No. 14-878-LPS-CJB).
GlaxoSmithKline has appealed.
128 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
129 For example, Amgen alleged conversion under California law, when Sandoz filed a biosimilar
application citing Amgen's biologics license but declined to participate in the premarket patent infor-
mation exchange specified in federal law for biosimilar applicants. See Amgen v. Sandoz, 794 F.3d 1347,
1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The trial court dismissed this claim on the theory that the statute permitted
Sandoz to decline participation. Id. at 1350-51. Neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court con-
sidered the conversion theory.
130 E.g., Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(finding the District of Columbia Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act preempted by federal patent
law, because it struck a different balance-from the one set by Congress-with respect to exclusionary
power, length of patent term, and conditions of patentability and thus rebalanced exclusion and free use).
The author is grateful to Professor Sarnoff for reminding her of this case.
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Federal law is designed to provide a temporary period of exclusive sales
for new uses. Yet innovators who develop new uses protected by patent and
exclusivity do not enjoy exclusive sales. ' 3' The problem is not that the patent
and regulatory exclusivity statutes are poorly drafted. Generic drugs are dis-
pensed for infringing uses because FDA designates them AB-rated, because
state laws and payers require or strongly encourage their substitution, and
because physicians are unlikely to write "dispense as written" when prescrib-
ing an innovative product for a new use (even if they have good reason to
suspect the new use is protected). Biosimilar biologics may also be dispensed
for unapproved protected uses when physicians prescribe them for those
uses, or when payers require their dispensing for those uses, and interchange-
able biologics are likely to be substituted for protected uses just as generic
drugs currently are. The problem stems from a combination of rules, prac-
tices, and policies in the broader regulatory approval, drug distribution, and
healthcare financing systems.
It is widely understood that these sales happen and that the sales are
flatly contrary to the intent of federal law. We have simply acquiesced to a
healthcare system in which they occur as a matter of course.' But the sales
need to stop if the federal laws in question are to have any meaning. The
subsections that follow describe steps policymakers could take. They recog-
nize that we have a profound interest in the prompt approval and seamless
substitution of generic equivalents for compounds and uses that are no longer
protected by patent or regulatory exclusivity. We also have a profound inter-
est in ensuring that physicians may prescribe approved medicines for unap-
proved and novel uses when, in their clinical judgment, doing so is in the best
interest of their patients. This part therefore assumes that any solution to the
problem described in Part III must achieve three objectives; it must: (1) elim-
inate infringing sales and uses; (2) permit approval and facilitate substitution
131 Although this Article focuses on innovators continuing to study their own approved drugs for
new uses, one company repurposing another company's drug for a new use will face a similar problem.
A physician might prescribe the original innovative product, even if that product is not approved for the
use. If generic substitutes are available, the pharmacist might substitute the generic version of the original
innovative product, even though it too is not approved for the use. The second innovator may never enjoy
the sale.
132 Policy discussions and policymakers frequently ignore this rampant disregard for federal law. For
instance, the Department of Health and Human Services calculates generic drug utilization rates by com-
paring the number of A-rated generic drugs dispensed with the number of prescriptions written. See, e.g.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., GENERIC DRUG UTILIZATION FN THE
MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 9 (2007), at 9. The policy discussion relating to generic utilization rates
and the savings that can be achieved with generic drugs is utterly divorced from the possibility that some
of those sales are for unapproved uses for which an innovator holds a patent or exclusivity. No one would
dispute that increasing lawful generic drug utilization contributes to the public welfare by reducing
healtheare costs. But when policymakers, researchers, and others include infringing sales in a highly
touted utilization rate, they endorse and implicitly encourage those sales.
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of generic drugs for unprotected compounds and unprotected uses; and (3)
permit physicians to engage in clinically motivated off-label prescribing.
A. Changes in Administrative Practices and Policies
To begin with, FDA should change its practices and policies that con-
tribute to the problem. None of these practices or policies are essential to
ensuring appropriate generic approvals and substitution. Because the under-
lying goal-ensuring that the innovator, alone, captures sales for the exclud-
able new use, as intended by Congress-is sound, the changes described be-
low should not be controversial, even if some of them would represent radical
changes in how the agency operates.
1. Revisions to the Orange Book
First, FDA should revise its approach to therapeutic equivalence ratings
in the Orange Book. This would be feasible without a change in the statute. 33
For instance, the agency could limit therapeutic equivalence determinations
to generic drugs with labeling identical to their reference products, except for
editorial differences stemming from the fact that the two drugs are produced
or distributed by different manufacturers. This would, however, be contro-
versial. Some generic drugs currently deemed therapeutically equivalent
would lose those ratings. And with this new policy in place, generic drugs
might receive and then lose these ratings (if the innovators obtained approval
of new uses). More significantly, this approach-though perhaps the simplest
133 As noted earlier, supra Section IIl.A., FDA created the Orange Book and invented therapeutic
equivalence ratings on its own initiative. The statute does not mention them. See generally 35 U.S.C. §
271. Although the agency could make changes to the Orange Book without legislative action, it should-
and almost certainly would-provide notice and solicit comment. FDA initially planned no administrative
proceedings when it constructed the Orange Book in 1979 and 1980. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Kennedy,
471 F. Supp. 1224, 1225-26 (D. Md. 1979). After the research-based industry brought suit challenging
the agency's statutory authority to issue the publication and the lack of administrative procedures, FDA
opted to conduct notice and comment rulemaking. Id. at 1226. The court, however, never reached the
merits of the procedural claim. See id. at 1227. Many years later, the agency rejected an argument that it
was required to use rulemaking before issuing therapeutic equivalence ratings for drugs approved under
section 505(b)(2), which is different from the generic drug provision. See Dep't of Health & Human Ser-
vices, Letter to Dan Himmelfarb, Philip Katz, and Benjamin Del Tito Re: Docket Nos. FDA-201 l-P-0610
and FDA-2013-P-0371 3 (July 23, 2014). FDA reasoned in part that therapeutic equivalence determina-
tions are not binding and have no legal effect. Id. at 15. FDA may well be correct that incorporation of its
advice into laws that are not administered by the agency (i.e., state pharmacy law) does not make the
advice binding for purposes of determining whether the Administrative Procedure Act requires rulemak-
ing. The changes described in the text would have a significant impact on regulated industry, and as a
practical matter FDA would probably choose a public procedure, particularly as it considered how to
apply the changes to drugs already listed in the Orange Book.
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change for FDA to make to the Orange Book-would fail the test specified
at the outset of this discussion. It would defeat automatic substitution for
compounds and uses that are no longer protected. Any solution adopted must
preserve automatic substitution of approved generics for compounds and
uses that are not protected by patent or exclusivity.
To help ensure that a generic drug would still be substituted automati-
cally for older unprotected uses, though, FDA could explore a rating system
that communicated partial therapeutic equivalence and full therapeutic equiv-
alence. One approach might be a special annotation to the AB rating to indi-
cate that the generic drug does not yet have the full scope of approval or
(therefore) therapeutic equivalence. A handful of drugs already have three-
letter ratings (AB I, AB2, and so forth), so another approach (such as AB-L,
for limited) would be necessary. 3 4 Another approach would be to assign ther-
apeutic equivalence on an indication-by-indication basis, which would re-
quire listing indications separately in the Orange Book. Regardless of the
changes made to the Orange Book, implementation (particularly re-rating all
generic drugs on the market today, under the new system) would be burden-
some for the agency, and the transition could be confusing to participants in
the healthcare system.
A broader philosophical objection to these suggestions would be that
therapeutic equivalence is a scientific and clinical concept, not a legal or reg-
ulatory concept. As a scientific matter, a generic drug that has the same
strength and is bioequivalent should produce the same clinical result in any
given patient, and this is true even with respect to uses for which the innova-
tor's product is not yet approved. In other words, some will feel that it is
disingenuous to suggest the generic drug is not therapeutically equivalent for
a particular use when, in fact, as a clinical matter, the drug is. The answer is
that FDA would have to recast what it is doing when it provides an AB rating
in the first instance. The Orange Book begins with a 20-page article describ-
ing the history and purpose of therapeutic equivalence determinations and
explaining the codes.'35 It is long past time for the agency to discuss in this
preface the significance of partial labeling and the importance of preserving
incentives for new-use innovation. FDA could explain that the AB rating re-
flects more than just a judgment about expected clinical results; it also takes
134 FDA assigns three-character codes when there is more than one reference listed drug with the
same active ingredient and strength, and the drugs are not bioequivalent to each other. For example, Al-
vogen holds an NDA for Adalat CC (nifedipine), and Pfizer holds an NDA for Procardia XL (nifedipine).
These are independently developed drugs and not bioequivalent to each other. Generic drugs therapeuti-
cally equivalent to Adalat CC receive an ABI rating, and generic drugs therapeutically equivalent to Pro-
cardia XL receive an AB2 rating. See 38TH ORANGE BOOK, supra note 93, at xv-xvi.
135 38TH ORANGE BOOK, supra note 93, at iv-xxv.
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account of domestic innovation policy and new-use incentives that the
agency itself is partially responsible for enforcing. 3 6
Another objection might be that restructuring the therapeutic equiva-
lence system will not meaningfully stem the tide of infringing uses. This is a
fair criticism. State laws vary. Some refer to substituting another drug with
the "same active ingredient," for instance, and others refer to substituting a
"generic" drug. 37 Surprisingly few reference a "therapeutic equivalence" de-
termination by FDA, let alone an "AB" rating. 38 Thus changes in the Orange
Book might not lead to a different result under the pharmacy laws of many
states. And in other states, even if FDA's changes prevented automatic sub-
stitution for infringing uses, a payer might nevertheless require use of the
generic drug (or steer patients toward the generic drug by accepting a lower
co-payment), without regard to the scope of its approval, the nature of the
patient's condition, or the scope of FDA's therapeutic equivalence determi-
nation. Without a strategy that also changes payer (or pharmacist, or pre-
scriber) practices, a refashioned Orange Book is therefore only a partial so-
lution. But as Part III illustrated, at least part of the problem is automatic
substitution under blanket AB ratings. And it is hard to conceive of a solution
involving payers, pharmacists, and prescribers that does not require greater
transparency across the board about the scope of each generic drug's ap-
proval. FDA has the last word on the scope of a drug's approval, and it is the
best positioned to maintain easily accessible databases about approved
drugs-and the scope of their approval-for healthcare professionals and
payers.
Moreover, it is not crazy to suggest the Orange Book be overhauled. As
noted, the publication is dated, and some of its policies may not be entirely
rational. There is room to wonder, for instance, why a 20 mg capsule should
not be rated therapeutically equivalent to a 20 mg tablet if in fact the two are
bioequivalent. Under the agency's current approach, they are not deemed
substitutable-which has led to ridiculous generic company strategies, like
136 FDA should also re-insert in the Orange Book the statement that it does not provide therapeutic
equivalence determinations for unapproved uses. This should not be controversial, but it also would not
have much impact standing alone.
137 E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 52.510(b) (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 08.80.480(11) (2017)
(permitting substitution only if the drug has the same established name, active ingredient, route of admin-
istration, dosage form, and strength); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-619(b) (West 2017) (permitting sub-
stitution of a "generic drug product with the same strength, quantity, dose and dosage form ... which is,
in the pharmacist's professional opinion, therapeutically equivalent"); MINN. STAT. § 151.21 (2018) (pro-
hibiting substitution of a generically equivalent drug "unless, in the pharmacist's professional judgment,
the substituted drug is therapeutically equivalent and interchangeable to the prescribed drug").
138 For examples that do, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-503(c) (2018); Ark. Bd. of Pharm. Regula-
tion 07-00-0006 (2014) (permitting a pharmacist to substitute only A-rated drugs); MISS. CODE. ANN. §
73-21-73(m) (2017) (defining "generic equivalent drug product" to include any drug listed by FDA as
therapeutically equivalent); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-2(13) (2017) (defining an "equivalent drug
product" as one deemed therapeutically equivalent in the latest edition of the Orange Book).
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placing tablets inside capsules. 13 9 FDA may soon start issuing interchangea-
bility ratings for biological products, and these will be added to the "Purple
Book," a document on the agency's website that lists licensed biologics and
biosimilars. '40 The agency has recently asked for input on the information
that it should include in the redesigned Purple Book, 14' which provides a good
opportunity for a redesign of the corresponding drug book or, perhaps, inte-
gration of the two into one database. Whatever FDA does with the Orange
Book and Purple Book, it would need to make conforming changes to the
Drugs@FDA website, 142 which also lists therapeutic equivalents for each ap-
proved drug.
2. Regulation of Generic Drug Promotion
Second, FDA should prohibit a drug company from discussing an un-
approved use with healthcare professionals or payers if the use is protected
by another company's patent or regulatory exclusivity. The agency has his-
torically taken the position that promotion of an approved drug for an unap-
proved use renders the drug misbranded (and in some cases an unapproved
new drug). 143 A series of First Amendment cases has prompted FDA to re-
view its regulations and policies governing medical product communica-
tions, and as part of this exercise it could take the opportumity to state that
companies may not discuss unapproved and infringing uses of their drugs. '44
139 For instance, Mylan Pharmaceuticals tucked its 100-milligram generic phenytoin tablet into a
capsule, in order to receive a rating of therapeutic equivalence to Dilantin (phenytoin), which was mar-
keted in capsule form. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Shalala, 202 F.3d 326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming
FDA's decision to find therapeutic equivalence).
140 See generally FDA, Purple Book: Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product
Exclusivity and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Develop-
mentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprved/ApprvaAppicatins/TherapeuticBiolog-
icApplications/Biosimilars/ucm4l1418.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
141 See HHS Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs, 83 Fed. Reg. 22,692,
22,696 (May 16, 2018) ("How could the Purple Book be more useful to health care professionals, patients,
manufacturers, and other stakeholders? What additional information could be added to increase the utility
of the Purple Book?").
142 Drugs@FDA is a portal through which one can access basic information and documents on ap-
proved new drugs and biological products, frequently including approval letters and agency review doc-
uments. See Drugs@FDA Database, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/lnformationOnDrugs/ucml35821.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018). For each listed product, there is a drop-down menu labeled "Therapeutic Equiv-
alents." See, e.g., Activase, DRUGS@FDA: FDA APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, https://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/indcx.cfm?event-overview.process&ApplNo=103172 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
143 See Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHi. L. REV. ONLINE
124, 129-33 (2016) (explaining theory).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that the prose-
cution of a sales representative marketing Xyrem (sodium oxybate) for off-label uses violated his first
amendment rights); Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting
manufacturer's motion for preliminary injunction in case alleging violation of first amendment rights
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Although any such prohibition would need to be squared with First Amend-
ment principles, precluding discussion of unapproved uses protected by pa-
tent or regulatory exclusivity would presumably directly advance the govern-
ment's substantial interest in preserving incentives for innovation. 4 FDA
appears to agree, noting that promotion of approved drugs for unapproved
uses "protected by patents or exclusivity held by another applicant.., would
undermine these incentives for innovation."'' 46
If the agency does not change its basic approach to AB ratings in the
Orange Book, it should resurrect its abandoned guidance governing promo-
tion by generic drug companies and, in that guidance, expressly prohibit
statements that a generic drug is equivalent, therapeutically equivalent, or
AB-rated if the drug is not approved for the same uses as the innovative drug,
unless the company also provides its labeling and points out in the same com-
munication that its drug is neither approved for, nor AB-rated for, all of the
uses. To be sure, generic companies usually do not promote their drugs, apart
from in press releases, on their websites, and in price catalogs distributed to
payers. But typically, these catalogs identify the corresponding innovative
drug and indicate whether the generic drug is AB-rated. FDA should require
full transparency in these documents about the scope of the generic drug's
approval.
This suggestion does not require a significant departure from current
advertising and promotion rules. Promotional pieces about a drug must pro-
vide information about the drug's approved uses in the same language as in
the approved package insert, 47 and industry practice is to provide the ap-
proved labeling at the same time. "'Reminder' labeling[,] which [ust] calls
attention to the name of the drug" and (if desired) the price, is exempt from
this requirement. 41 If a piece suggests the drug's use, however, it is not re-
minder labeling, and FDA takes the view that comparing one drug to another
implies the drug's uses. 149 This is why FDA issued draft guidance in 1994
based on threatened enforcement action for promotion of a drug for an off-label use). The FDA has re-
leased several draft and final guidance documents as a part of this process. See, e.g., FDA, MEDICAL
PRODUCT COMMUNICATIONS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FDA-REQUIRED LABELING: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS 1 (2018).
145 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (laying out test for constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions which includes whether the
restriction directly advances a substantial government interest); e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (granting
Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries"); Exec. Order No. 13,731, 81 Fed. Reg.
42,221 (June 24, 2016) (noting that "[i]t is in the national interest for the Federal Government to support
innovation").
146 See FDA, MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 16.
147 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (2017).
148 Id. § 201.100(f).
149 E.g., FDA, Reminder Advertisements and Labeling, OPDP FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(FAQs), https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/
ucm090308.htm#ReminderAdvertisementsandLabeling (last visited Aug. 18, 2018).
20181
GEO. MASON L. REv.
explaining that statements in labeling and advertising that a generic drug is
equivalent, bioequivalent, or AB-rated "take the promotional material out of
the reminder labeling or advertising exemption." 5 0 The agency said it would
exercise enforcement discretion with respect to the requirement to include
the full labeling in the case of a price catalog listing the generic manufac-
turer's entire product line with bioequivalence codes.'51 But it did not an-
nounce enforcement discretion with respect to any other provisions of law,
such as the rule that the labeling may not be false or misleading, including
misleading by omission. 52
FDA withdrew the guidance in 1997, announcing plans to issue a new
guidance on generic drug promotion that further explored the use of the term
"A-rated" in promotional materials. 53 More than twenty years have passed,
and it appears the agency has not yet issued the guidance in question. As part
of its review of the regulation of medical product communications, FDA
could revive this guidance. To affirm its commitment to the statutory incen-
tives for new-use innovation, the agency could reaffirm the position that it
took in 1994 and decline to exercise enforcement discretion. Thus, any state-
ments about AB rating would need to be accompanied by the generic drug's
approved labeling-which would show the scope of the drug's approval.
FDA could take an even more aggressive stance, explaining that if: (1)
a generic company promotes its drug as "A-rated" when the drug is not ap-
proved for all of the innovator's indications, all of the innovator's indications
are "intended uses" of the generic drug in question; and (2) a generic com-
pany disseminates promotional pieces stating that its product is "AB rated"
in this situation, the labeling in question is misleading by omission. This
would need to be supported by clarification in the Orange Book that AB rat-
ings apply only to approved uses. These theories would, operating together,
render the generic drug misbranded under section 502 of the FDCA, which
in turn would mean the generic companies with partial labeling could not
make those statements. 5 4 The agency could also prioritize enforcement ac-
tion against generic drug companies that promote their approved generic
150 FDA Letter to Industry, Current Issues and Procedures (April 1994).
151 ld.
152 Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 352(a) (2012).
153 See Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotional Labeling; Development and Use of FDA
Guidance Documents; Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 14,912, 14,916 (Mar. 28, 1997).
154 First, if a drug has an intended use for which it is not approved, then its approved labeling will
lack adequate information for prescribers for that use, rendering the drug out of compliance with 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.100 (2017). Prescription drugs in compliance with section 20 1.100 receive an exemption from sec-
tion 502(f)(1) of the FDCA, which would otherwise deem them misbranded for lacking adequate direc-
tions for (lay) use. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (explaining that "[a]dequate directions for use" means adequate
directions for lay use, which means that prescription drugs are inherently misbranded under section
502(f)(1) and must qualify for the exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 201.100). Second, section 502(a) deems a
drug misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular, and section 201 (n) adds that label-
ing may be misleading if it fails to reveal facts that are material in light of the representations made or
material in view of the consequences resulting from use.
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drugs for unapproved uses, whether directly or through reference to AB rat-
ings.
But these steps, too, are partial solutions. If state law and payer practices
remain the same, cabining promotion by generic companies will help only
around the margins. Again, though, a solution involving payers, pharmacists,
and prescribers will inherently require greater transparency across the board
about the scope of each generic drug's approval. The suggestions in the pre-
ceding paragraphs should not be controversial. They aim to ensure that ge-
neric companies-like FDA-take reasonable steps to ensure that accurate
and full information about the approval of their drugs flows to all relevant
participants in the healthcare system.
3. Education about New-Use Protections and Partial Labeling
FDA should educate participants in the healthcare system about the im-
portance of new-use protections and the meaning of partial labeling. As noted
already, the agency should more prominently discuss the significance of par-
tial labeling in the Orange Book. It would also be helpful for FDA to restate
the purpose of its practice of medicine policy, confirming that the policy does
not describe situations in which a physician prescribes or administers a ge-
neric or biosimilar for an unapproved use for which another company holds
a patent or regulatory exclusivity. Clarifying the purpose of the practice of
medicine policy could be part of a broader signal to the healthcare commu-
nity that society has a profound interest in maintaining statutory incentives
to develop new uses. Although likely more controversial, FDA could require
drug companies with partial labeling to include "Dear Pharmacist" (and
"Dear Doctor") letters with every shipment, stating that: (1) the product in
question is not approved for every indication and therefore not AB rated for
every indication; (2) unlabeled uses may be protected by patent and/or exclu-
sivity held by another company; and (3) selling or using the product for these
protected uses would be inconsistent with federal law and may expose the
seller or user to liability. This would not be burdensome; as noted, drug com-
panies are already required to include labeling with every shipment. 55
4. Refraining from Encouraging Infringing Uses
It should go without saying that agency staff should not publicly dis-
seminate information about the safety and effectiveness of infringing uses of
generic drugs and biosimilars. With the narrow exception of noisy carve-outs
that Congress has authorized, no generic drug labeling should suggest or
155 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1).
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imply a use for which the drug is not approved. 56 No biosimilar labeling
should suggest or imply a use for which the biosimilar is not approved.'57
And FDA officials should not publicly vouch for the safety and effectiveness
of a generic drug or biosimilar biologic for patented or exclusivity-protected
uses that the company does not seek for the product's labeling.' The
agency's affirmative contribution to the problem, however small the contri-
bution might be in practice, must stop.
B. Action-Forcing Legislative Steps
To stop infringing sales and uses, federal or state legislative action
might be needed. Each of the three ideas below places the burden on a dif-
ferent entity in the healthcare delivery system. The goal in each case is to
prompt adoption of a private solution-which would probably involve indi-
cation-based prescribing, dispensing, and pricing-that will put an end to in-
fringing sales and uses while preserving the sale and use of generic drugs for
off-patent and unprotected uses.
1. Pharmacists
First, Congress could prohibit pharmacists from dispensing a generic
drug or biosimilar drug for a protected use that does not appear in its labeling.
Although pharmacy regulations are usually a matter of state law, there is
some precedent for handling this at the federal level. It is currently an act of
156 FDA's regulations already prohibit any statements in labeling that suggest or imply an off-label
use. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2)(iv) (stating that for drugs, "[i]ndications or uses must not be implied
or suggested in other sections of the labeling if not included in this [Indications] section."); id. §
201.57(c)(2)(v) (similar rule for biological products). Noisy carve-outs are inconsistent with this regula-
tion. Congress has authorized noisy carve-outs for new pediatric uses in narrow circumstances, see supra
Section IIIA, but this effectively voids the patents and exclusivity protecting those uses and should be
reconsidered.
157 Again, FDA's regulations already prohibit this. See supra note 156.
158 And yet they do so. For instance, in connection with its February 2016 advisory committee meet-
ing considering the biosimilar Inflectra (infliximab-dyyb), FDA openly discussed use of the biosimilar
for pediatric ulcerative colitis, even though the innovator held orphan exclusivity protecting the indication
until September 2018. E.g., FDA, BRIEFING DOCUMENT: ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING,
BLA 125544 7, 10 (2016). Further, even though it did not ask committee members to vote on licensure
for the indication, it asked their views on the product's biosimilarity for the indication. Id. at 12. See also
FDA, TRANSCRIPT, ARTHRITIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 217 (2016) (presenting agency's view that similar
pharmacokinetics and bio-distribution would be expected for pediatric ulcerative colitis); id. at 331-32
(explaining that final discussion topic will be whether there is sufficient scientific justification to support
a determination of biosimilarity for pediatric ulcerative colitis); id. at 389-413 (committee discussion of
various indications including pediatric ulcerative colitis). A spokesperson for the National Organization
for Rare Disorders objected to FDA's decision to discuss the indication. Id. at 309-11.
[VOL. 26:1
PAPER PROMISES FOR DRUG INNOVATION
"misbranding" under the FDCA for a pharmacist to dispense a prescription
drug without an effective oral or written prescription. 5 9 Congress could sim-
ilarly deem it an act of misbranding to dispense a generic drug or biosimilar
biologic for a use for which the product lacks adequate directions (which
would effectively mean an unlabeled use) if the information was carved out
due to another company's patent or exclusivity.' 61 Of course, a pharmacist
would need to know the planned use of the drug for this to work. But if this
were made law and FDA indicated plans to enforce the provision (perhaps
with a mandate to do so and enhanced penalty provisions), then presumably
pharmacists would be motivated to work with other parties in the healthcare
delivery and finance system to ensure that the necessary information was
provided. For instance, pharmacists might refuse to substitute generic drugs
with partial labeling without assurances that the prescriptions fell within their
labeling. 6 1 This refusal would inform contract negotiations between pharma-
cies and payers and between pharmacies and generic drug companies. Payers
might be motivated to switch to a system in which every reimbursed generic
drug sale required a diagnosis that corresponded to the drug's labeling. [62
Without a doubt, pharmacists would oppose this proposal. But placing
the burden on pharmacists is appealing for the simple reason that they are in
the best position to avoid an infringing sale and use. The pharmacist knows
which generic drug might be dispensed to a particular patient. And the phar-
macist has a copy of the professional labeling for the generic drug in ques-
tion, because federal law requires that the labeling be shipped with the drug.
Still, pharmacists might be concerned about the judgment calls necessary un-
der this model. For instance, if two indications (one in the labeling, and one
carved out) were similar but not identical, and if the patient's condition did
not fit squarely within either, it might be difficult for the pharmacist to deter-
mine whether the patient's use was the carved-out use. Perhaps contractual
negotiations between pharmacists and payers would place the risk on the
payer in these situations. In other instances, a protected new use might not
correspond directly to an approved indication statement, which could make
it hard for a pharmacist to determine whether treatment of the patient falls
within the carved-out use. This could be addressed by limiting the new mis-
branding provision to "new indications," rather than the broader "new uses,"
but it could also be addressed privately through payers assuming the risk.
Something similar could instead be done at the state level. That is, the
states could amend their pharmacy laws to require that, if a generic drug or
'59 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (2012).
160 This should apply only if the innovator holds a patent or exclusivity. If it applied more broadly,
it would frustrate traditional off-label prescribing. FDA, which has enforcement responsibility for the
misbranding provision and for the approval of labeling, will know whether the use in question was carved
out for reasons of patent or exclusivity. See supra Section IlI.A.
161 There might be preemption issues to sort through, particularly if state law required substitution.
162 Payers already collect information about a patient's condition and the planned use of a medicine,
when they subject a drug or biologic to "prior authorization" requirements. Roin, supra note 7, at 58-65.
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biosimilar has partial labeling due to regulatory exclusivity or patent protec-
tion, the pharmacist verify that the patient's condition is a labeled use before
dispensing the product. It would, however, be difficult to persuade every
state's legislature to act. Each would have to agree to enact legislation bol-
stering federal intellectual property policy at considerable expense to its own
budget. Even if every state could be persuaded to act, which seems improb-
able, uniformity in approach would be unlikely. Because the issue is ulti-
mately a matter of national innovation policy, it seems a better fit for federal
rather than state legislation.
2. Payers
Second, Congress might focus on payers. Professor Roin suggests a
model in which pharmaceutical companies require payment from health in-
surers for infringing sales. 63 He views the problem of new uses as an infor-
mation problem and argues that current patent law would provide sufficient
incentive for new-use innovation if only pharmaceutical companies had suf-
ficient information (about prescribing and dispensing) to enforce their pa-
tents. 64 In his model, therefore, a pharmacist would dispense the generic drug
for the unapproved use and report the sale to the pharmacy benefit manager
and innovator, allowing the innovator to bill the insurer directly for the
sale. 65 If the new use was protected by patent, the invoice would presumably
be presented as an alternative to suit for inducing patent infringement.
For this proposal to work for patents, the pharmacist would need to
know how the patient planned to use the drug, and she would need to be
required (or motivated) to report either all sales or all off-label sales to the
payer and the innovator. This, too, could be tucked into the misbranding pro-
visions. Rather than deeming it an act of misbranding to dispense a generic
drug for a use that was carved out due to patent or exclusivity, Congress could
deem it an act of misbranding to dispense a generic drug or biosimilar with-
out disclosing the sale and diagnosis to the payer and the innovator--or per-
haps to the government for inclusion in a database that aggregated data for
innovators. 66 Again, however, the pharmacist would need to know the
163 See id. at 36.
164 See id. at 35-37, 51, 55.
165 See id. at 59. In the alternative, the pharmacist could dispense the innovator's drug. See id
166 Professor Roin suggests a different statutory approach; he would have Congress allow drug com-
panies "to require indication reporting whenever physicians prescribe [the] drug." Id. at 61 n.431. He
draws an analogy to use and distribution restrictions for high risk drugs under section 505-1 of the FDCA,
pursuant to which a pharmacist or physician may be required to confirm the diagnosis of a patient before
dispensing or administering a drug. See id. Professor Halabi responds that giving pharmaceutical compa-
nies access to information about prescribing practices "will generate as much or more off-label promotion
activity and compromise the physician-patient relationship." Halabi, supra note 36, at 70-73 (capitaliza-
tion altered). Putting aside possible replies to Professor Halabi's speculation about generating off-label
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patient's diagnosis, and perhaps this would be solved privately once the phar-
macies faced liability for misbranding. But regulating communications be-
tween pharmacists and payers goes well beyond the current scope of FDA's
authority. As a purely philosophical matter, this might be better in a stand-
alone piece of legislation rather than the misbranding provisions of the drug
statute.
It is possible this approach would end infringing sales rather than result-
ing in regular payments to innovators for those sales. The threat of suits for
patent infringement, and the reality of paying for patent infringement, might
prompt payers to construct systems that prevent dispensing for protected
uses. 167
But this idea has several shortcomings. To begin with, it does nothing
to address new uses protected by three-year exclusivity or orphan exclusivity,
even though some new uses may be protected only by exclusivity. Exclusiv-
ity operates against FDA alone; there is no liability for infringing sales, nor
is there any theory of induced liability. Without a credible threat of suit, an
invoice from the innovator might be disregarded. Congress could enact lia-
bility for infringement of exclusivities, but doing so would be inconsistent
with nearly a century of food and drug law. As a general rule, there are no
private rights of action under the FDCA. 6 8
Even if we accepted a solution limited to new uses with patent protec-
tion, the proposed misbranding provision would work only because it creates
the means for an enforcement-backed invoice to the payer. But it is not clear
whether payers would view the threat of a patent infringement suit as credi-
ble. Payers are not appealing defendants for an innovator; they are the com-
pany's customers.
For this reason, some will argue that Congress should dispense with
helping innovators enforce their patents and simply require payers to make
innovators whole. Lost profits might be straightforward to calculate if the
innovator had sold its product for the protected use before FDA approved the
generic drug. 6 9 Presumably, this would end infringing sales by motivating
promotion, there is no obvious reason why a proposal that insurers compensate innovators for infringing
sales requires innovators to receive patient-specific or physician-specific information.
167 As Professor Roin points out, this could be accomplished by extending prior authorization sys-
tems to include new uses for approved drugs. See Roin, supra note 7, at 62-65.
168 See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, all such
proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of
the United States."); id. § 337(b) (authorizing the states to restrain violations of certain food law provi-
sions). But see id. § 399d(b)(7) (authorizing private suit by whistleblower in a food facility to require
employer's compliance with an order providing relief to whistleblower).
169 Lost profits are the default measure for compensatory damages for patent infringement. Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied 516 U.S. 867 (1995)
("[T]he general rule for determining actual damages to a patentee that is itself producing the patented item
is to determine the sales and profits lost to the patentee because of the infringement."). At a minimum the
patentee is entitled to a reasonable royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
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payers to adopt whatever systems were necessary to avoid damages liabil-
ity. 110 But there are reasons to object to this philosophically. Conceding in-
fringing sales and working out a system for payment to the innovator renders
the actual incentives-the patent and the exclusivity-effectively irrelevant.
As for exclusivity, it means next to nothing for FDA approval to be withheld
if federal law is arranged to condone sales despite the lack of approval and,
indeed, creates a mechanism for compensation. In the case of patents, with a
method for compensation that implicitly blesses infringement, it would be
hard to claim that the patent still grants the right to exclude.
3. Generic Companies
Third, Congress could instead require payment by the generic compa-
nies whose drugs are sold and used for infringing purposes. As noted earlier,
under current law there is very little prospect of private relief against the ge-
neric companies. Patent doctrine generally does not lead to generic liability
for induced infringement, at least in the conventional pre-launch situation,
and exclusivity cannot be privately enforced. But Congress could require a
generic or biosimilar company to make the innovator whole for any sale lost
because its product was dispensed for a use protected by patent or exclusiv-
ity. This legislation would be more complex than a narrow misbranding pro-
vision targeted at pharmacists, and it is subject to the same basic philosophi-
cal objection as legislation requiring payers to make innovators whole. An
elaborate scheme for payment from generic companies to innovators,
grounded in indication-specific pricing, amounts to giving up on new-use
patents and exclusivity. There would be no right to exclude on the patent, as
a practical matter. 171 And the lack of regulatory approval for the uses in ques-
tion would be a sham. This would be an attractive and simple solution, but it
does violence to patent law and drug approval law.
If Congress took this approach, however, a generic drug manufacturer
would need to track the extent to which the product was dispensed for unla-
beled protected uses. This would require the cooperation of pharmacists and
payers, which could be accomplished by making the payer jointly liable for
each sale. Or, as an alternative to requiring payment tied to actual sales for
infringing use, Congress could require the generic company and payer to
make payments based on the percentage of sales expected to result from the
unlabeled indication. For instance, if 85% of the innovator's sales (prior to
170 Rebecca Eisenberg, Professor, University of Michigan, Panel Discussion at Session 2G of the
University College London and Georgetown University Law Center's Clinical Innovation Conference, at
15 (Feb. 8-9, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/ucl-georgetown_
clinical-innovation-conference_transcript_09febl 8_pm.pdf) [hereinafter SECOND MEDICAL USE
CONFERENCE].
171 Consider, by way of analogy, the compulsory licensing provisions of copyright law. E.g., 17
U.S.C. § 111 (c)-(d) (2012) (granting cable companies a "statutory license" to retransmit a performance
of a work embodied in a primary transmission by a broadcast station).
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generic entry) were for the second-approved indication still under patent,
then it stands to reason that-with automatic substitution-85% of the ge-
neric drug sales would be for the same indication. Or, if 85% of the prescrip-
tions for the innovative product were written for the protected use, then pre-
sumably 85% of the generic drugs dispensed would be sold for the use in
question. The obligation to make the innovator whole could be rebuttable
with proof of the actual purpose of every sale. This would provide generic
companies and payers with a strong incentive to develop systems for tracking
the purpose of sales.
In the end, this too might stem the tide of infringing sales, rather than
compensating the innovator for those sales. Unless the price of generic drugs
increased to cover the payments for infringing sales, payments for infringing
sales could be prohibitively high, which could prompt a private solution that
prevented the infringing sales. 7
2
CONCLUSION
The legislative proposals described in Part IV reflect the intuition that
multiple stakeholders are involved and responsible, when an infringing sale
and use occur, and that these stakeholders could solve the new-use problem
by working together. The proposals all take the same basic approach: create
a credible threat of liability for one (or several) of these stakeholders to en-
courage them to work together to design that solution.
In theory, any of the three legislative approaches described in Part IV is
actionable. And each has advantages and disadvantages. Placing the burden
on the pharmacist makes some sense, for instance, because the pharmacist
knows which generic drug the patient might receive and because the pharma-
cist is the last person in a position to prevent or conduct a sale for an infring-
ing use. Placing the burden on the payer may make the most sense because
payers play an intermediary role connecting the other stakeholders, they are
well-positioned to require disclosure of the planned use from the physician,
and they have the leverage to dictate to the pharmacy which product will be
dispensed. But if this legislative strategy used the threat of a patent infringe-
ment case to motivate payers, it would leave out new uses that are protected
only by new-use or orphan exclusivity. All three suggestions in Part IV would
benefit from more vetting than possible in this Article, but placing the burden
on the generic company by requiring lost-profit payment for the percentage
of sales expected to result from unlabeled and protected indications would
cover new uses protected by both patent and exclusivity, and it has the benefit
of administrative simplicity. Imposing joint liability on payers would involve
the party in the best position to bring everyone to the table quickly.
172 E.g., Brian Hirsch, Vice President, Global IP and Legal Head North America, Glenmark Phar-
maceuticals, SECOND MEDICAL USE CONFERENCE, supra note 170, at 12.
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There might be other ways to motivate payers, pharmacists, and generic
drug companies to design a system that will prevent infringing sales and uses.
The purpose of this Article is to point out that these stakeholders could solve
the problem of new uses, if properly motivated, not to advocate for a partic-
ular way of motivating them.
The preceding discussion assumes both that new-use innovation will re-
main risky and expensive and that we want to continue to encourage this
innovation with new-use patents and regulatory exclusivity. There are other
ideas in the literature. Broadly speaking, we might change the drug regula-
tory paradigm or change the statutory incentives.
Changing the regulatory paradigm might mean reducing the burden of
new-use research in the first place.'73 FDA is taking steps in this direction.
Congress amended the FDCA in December, 2016, to require the agency to
develop a framework for evaluating "real world evidence" to help support
new-use approvals. 17 4 Although the new-use framework remains under de-
velopment, the agency has used real world evidence to support decisionmak-
ing in the past, and it expanded a drug's indication on the basis of real world
evidence in May, 2017.175 One possibility might be to approve a new use on
the basis of a smaller safety and effectiveness study plus real world evidence,
subject to an obligation to conduct additional studies after approval of the
use. 176 Whether this would reduce the overall cost of developing a new use
173 An even more radical approach would be to shift to using public funds for new-use research and
development. Cf Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intel-
lectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 51
(2009) (proposing that new drug development be publicly funded); Arti Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs,
and-Incentives: A New Battle in theDrug Patent Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491,492 (2012) (suggesting
that the "investment in well-designed trials" to show effectiveness of new uses "need not emerge... only
from individual firms operating in secrecy and motivated by patents" and that "the public sector's role is
likely to increase").
174 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355g (Supp. 2017)). "Real world evidence" means data on usage, benefits, or risks that derive from
sources other than traditional clinical trials. 21 U.S.C § 355g(b). FDA officials have recently authored
several scientific articles on the use of real-world evidence relating to medical products. See, e.g., Rachel
E. Sherman et al., Accelerating Development of Scientific Evidence for Medical Products Within the Ex-
isting US Regulatory Framework, 16 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 297 (2017); Rachel E. Sherman ct al.,
Real-World Evidence: What Is It and What Can It Tell Us?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2016). The
Agency has also developed thinking on the use of real-world evidence relating to medical devices. FDA,
USE OF REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES
4(2017).
175 FDA approved an extension of Kalydeco (ivacaftor)'s indication from 10 cystic fibrosis muta-
tions to 33 mutations, based on registry data and laboratory research. Cole Werble, Real- World Evidence:
Advice, Principles and Examples Emerge from FDA, PINK SHEET (Oct. 7, 2017, 4:22 PM),
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS 12171 5/Real World- Evidence-Advice-Principles-And-
Examples-Emerge-From-FDA.
176 This would be consistent with a broader trend in the regulation of new drugs, recently described
by Professor Price as a "gradually shifting toward a blended approach-a 'life-cycle' approach to devcl-
oping evidence, in the words of an influential Institute of Medicine report-where information gathering
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remains to be seen, though it has the potential to speed its approval.177 If it
resulted in new-use approval earlier in a drug's lifecycle, the additional time
to market the new use under the compound exclusivity and patent might be
valuable and partially mitigate the lack of meaningful protection for the new
use itself. After the compound exclusivity and patent expired, however, the
reduced premarket burden for new-use approval might be insufficient to mo-
tivate new-use innovation. The innovator would still need a way to recover
the investment and pay for any post-approval confirmatory trials, and auto-
matic substitution would defeat its exclusivity.
Rather than reducing the regulatory burden of new-use approval, Con-
gress might instead increase the incentive for new-use research. t7 ' Simply
increasing the length of new-use exclusivity, however, does not address the
basic problem described in this Article. The new use must also be excludable.
For this reason, some suggest increasing the basic data exclusivity term. 179 At
the very least, data exclusivity for new chemical entities could be increased
to the twelve years that biologics enjoy. 80 The basic compound exclusivity
prevents approval of a generic or biosimilar for any use for a period of time.
Lengthening the compound exclusivity for new drugs to twelve years would
provide an incentive for companies to develop new uses of those drugs for at
least a decade after initial FDA approval. This is because the new use would
be effectively excludable during the balance of the compound exclusivity
term. Further lengthening the term of the compound exclusivity for drugs and
biologics-for example, to fifteen or seventeen years-would have the same
effect, and there has been some legislative interest in allowing innovators to
both before and after approval are each key to regulation of drugs." W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval
in a Learning Health System, 102 MiNN. J. 2413, 2430-31 (2018).
177 Use of real-world evidence might not reduce the overall risk or cost, if the innovator was required
to confirm safety and effectiveness for the new use after approval and if policymakers remained commit-
ted to the substantial evidence standard for effectiveness.
178 Professor Roin has suggested, for instance, that three years is insufficient to motivate investment
in new uses that require extensive trials. Roin, supra note 7, at 71.
179 Consider, for instance, the proposal from Robert Armitage, former General Counsel of Eli Lilly,
that policymakers enact legislation offering drug innovators the option to elect a fixed period of protection
from generic competition, in exchange for expiry of key patents (such as those protecting the drug's active
ingredient, physical form, formulation, and uses) fourteen years after approval. Robert A. Armitage, IP
Strategy & Policy Consultant, Marco Island, Panel Discussion at Session 2C of the University College
London and Georgetown University Law Center's Clinical Innovation Conference, at 15 (Feb. 9, 2018)
(transcript available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/ucl georgetown clinical-innovation-
conference-transcript 09feb18 am.pdf).
180 See Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in
the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 223 (2015). Under current
law, a generic application cannot be submitted until five years after new chemical entity exclusivity, alt-
hough this period drops to four years if the generic applicant challenges a patent. 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). If the patent owner brings a timely suit, FDA cannot approve the generic applica-
tion for another 30 months or until 7.5 years after new chemical entity approval, whichever comes later.
Id.; id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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opt into longer exclusivity by disclaiming patent coverage.18 Indication-
based pricing might be a way for the innovator to recover the new-use invest-
ment in the later years without an unexpected and unwelcome increase in the
price for established uses. But legislation that simply modified the data ex-
clusivity term would not in itself provide any incentive for payers and phar-
macists to adopt systems that tracked prescribing and dispensing by planned
use.
Tackling the new-use problem through longer exclusivity for the com-
pound is appealing because many factors contributing to the problem (the
scope of AB ratings, the content and layout of Orange Book, state substitu-
tion laws, and pharmacy and payer practices) are entrenched in our healthcare
system. But longer exclusivity on the compound could be controversial.
Some would find it an over-inclusive solution on the theory that it would
delay generic and biosimilar versions of the molecule past expiry on the com-
position of matter patent simply to encourage new-use innovation that might
or might not happen. An alternative, responding to this concern, might adopt
a variation of the European approach to new-use exclusivity, allowing exten-
sion of the compound exclusivity if the innovator secured approval of signif-
icant new uses, not to exceed some total number of years, such as twelve or
fifteen. 18 2 But even this solution is imperfect. Towards the end of the exclu-
sivity period, the value of the incentive would drop (unless the innovator
could adopt indication-based pricing), which might affect which types of new
uses were pursued. Moreover, the solution would do nothing for new-use in-
novation after the core exclusivity on the compound expired.
The problem with increasing the incentive for new-use research is that
there is nothing wrong with the current incentives. Putting aside potential
uncertainty about new-use patents injected by the Supreme Court's recent
patent eligibility rulings,183 patents and regulatory exclusivity are adequate
for the task of encouraging new-use innovation. The theory of incentivizing
through excludability is solid. We have simply allowed new-use excludabil-
ity to be gutted by a combination of imprecise and overbroad agency, payer,
prescriber, and pharmacy practices and policies. In principle, the solution
should be to modify those practices and policies so new-use patents and reg-
ulatory exclusivity work as Congress intended.
181 See e.g., MODDERN Cures Act of201 1, H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); MODDERN Cures
Act of 2013, H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013). These bills generally track Mr. Armitage's proposal.
See Armitage, supra note 179, at 15.
182 In addition to providing one year of exclusivity for a new use supported by significant preclinical
or clinical data, no matter when that use is approved, European law provides an extra year of exclusivity
on the compound for a new indication approved in the first eight years that "bring[s] a significant clinical
benefit in comparison with existing therapies." Krista Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unof-
ficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD &
DRUG L. J. 671,691 (2010).
183 See supra note 57.
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Recasting the problem this way-as the gutting of extant federal law-
avoids one of the challenges faced by scholars of innovation policy: the chal-
lenge of assessing the but-for world. Scholarship that points to shortcomings
in domestic innovation policy suffers from an intrinsic proof problem; it is
hard to prove what might have been developed and approved had the rules in
the past been different. Often, we respond by explaining the potential for
harm to the public health. Exclusivity provides an incentive to study new
uses. In the absence of exclusivity, the research will not be done, which
means that important new uses will remain unexplored. So, we offer exam-
ples of uses that should be explored. Professor Roin's unpublished paper con-
tains a rich discussion of lost medical treatments. 184 Professor Halabi has of-
fered a detailed case study of metformin, which is approved for treatment of
diabetes but thought to have potential to treat nonalcoholic fatty liver disease,
polycystic ovary syndrome, Alzheimer's disease, obesity, and cancer. 185 He
points to a "narrative now prevailing in the scholarly literature," that the com-
panies responsible for metformin have not explored these alternatives "be-
cause there is no incentive to do So."1"86 And the literature is full of examples
of approved drugs that might have promise in other diseases. 87
We do not have sufficient information to know whether, and to what
extent, the lack of new-use excludability has deterred companies that might
otherwise have invested in the research. Nor do we know that making new
uses excludable will solve the problem. To some extent, this Article avoids
the problem of proof, because it does not propose a change in federal inno-
vation policy. It casts the problem as the fact that existing incentives-pa-
tents and exclusivity already enacted by Congress and applicable to new
uses-are undermined. Congress meant for new uses to be excludable, and
currently they are not.
In light of some of the more radical proposals on the table, that range
from publicly funding all new drug research to lengthening data exclusivity
for all new medicines, taking steps to ensure that new use patents and exclu-
sivity simply operate as intended would be a reasonable and moderate first
184 Roin, supra note 7, at 40-45.
185 See generally Halabi, supra note 36.
186 Id. at 45.
187 Hundreds of scientific articles discussing the repurposing of drugs appear in the National Library
of Medicine database. E.g., Shuchi Mittal, /-Adrenoreceptor Is a Regulator of the a-synuclein Gene Driv-
ing Risk ofParkinson's Disease, 357 SCIENCE 891, 891 (2017) (suggesting that clenbuterol-an asthma
medication approved in other countries-may have promise for treatment of Parkinson's); Theodore
Keats et al., The Rationale for Repurposing Sildenafil for Lung Cancer Treatment, 18 ANTI-CANCER
AGENTS MED. CHEMISTRY 367, 367 (2017) (noting "a considerable body of evidence" that sildenafil-
the active ingredient in Viagra, indicated to treat erectile dysfunction-has "anticancer properties"); Bern-
hard W. Renz et al., Repurposing Established Compounds to Target Pancreatic Cancer Stem Cells
(CSCs), 5 MED. SC. 14, 14-15 (2017) (suggesting a variety of compounds to target a variety of cancer
types based on emerging evidence such as the antiemetic agent aprepitant for pediatric liver cancer).
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step. A narrow fix that makes these incentives work as they were indisputably
intended should not require new normative or empirical justification.'88
One problem policymakers would face, though, is that the current ap-
proach to drug prescribing, dispensing, coverage, and reimbursement may be
entrenched. The question is whether the benefits of inertia justify missing out
on significant new cures. Policymakers focus more on drug prices today than
they do on innovation policy. But meaningful innovation incentives are an
investment in the future. The question is if we do not act today to repair the
existing incentives for new-use innovation, we will regret our inaction in the
future-when it is too late.
188 Additional normative and empirical work could, however, be helpful. For instance, it may help
to understand why - given the problem described in this Article - companies develop any new uses at
all. It is possible that most new uses are introduced before the compound exclusivity and patent expire,
and that the others necessitate a change in the product (such as a new route of administration) that is itself
protected. The author is generating a dataset that will permit some empirical examination of this question.
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